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THE PRICE OF LAW: HOW THE MARKET 
FOR LA WYERS DISTORTS THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Gillian K. Hadfield* 
Q. How many lawyers does it take to screw in a light bulb? 
A. How many can you afford?1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bill Clinton's legal bills in connection with the Lewinsky scandal 
topped $10 million;2 the bill for Ken Starr's investigation of the Presi­
dent exceeded $50 million.3 The cost to the eight families portrayed in 
the bestseller A Civil Action for their tort suit against a manufacturing 
company accused of dumping hazardous chemicals into the water sup­
ply was $4.8 million (paid from a settlement of about $8 million); the 
cost for the defense exceeded $7 million.4 Lawyers who represented 
the three states in the nationwide suit by state attorneys general 
against tobacco companies to recoup smoking-related health care 
costs were awarded $8.2 billion in legal fees, averaging in some cases 
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- Ed. I have benefited enormously from conversations about this work with numerous 
colleagues. I am particularly grateful to Ken Arrow, Kyle Bagwell, Bruce Chapman, Ron 
Daniels, Kevin Davis, Bill Eskridge, John Ferejohn, Marc Galanter, Vic Goldberg, Jeff 
Gordon, Jack Heinz, Frank Mathewson, Bob Mnookin, Mayo Moran, Deborah Rhode, and 
Michael Trebilcock for extensive and generous co=ents and discussions, and to Columbia 
Law School, Cornell Law School, Stanford Law School, the Hoover Institute, the American 
Bar Foundation, and the University of Toronto and Osgoode Hall for providing me with an 
opportunity to discuss this work with a wide range of researchers in the legal profession 
while the paper was in preparation. This paper could not have been completed without the 
opportunity provided by Columbia Law School, the Olin Foundation, and the Connaught 
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Viswanathan and David Thomson for research assistance. 
1. Lawyer Jokes (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.kinseylaw.com!JOKES/Jokes. 
html#anochor772866>. 
2 See Katherine Q. Seelye, Financial Holdings Stay Steady for Clinton but Legal Fees 
Soar, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at A18. 
3. See Editorial, An Unmoumed Death, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1999, at BS. 
4. See JONATHAN HARR, A C!vIL ACTION 453-54 (1995). 
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over half a billion dollars per lawyer.5 Total revenues to legal service 
providers in the U.S. now reach over $125 billion annually, having 
grown at a rate that far outstrips the growth in the economy generally 
in the past few decades.6 
These astronomical and seemingly exceptional figures betray a 
more widespread reality: legal process has become extraordinarily 
expensive, for all matters. The legal fees for a Canadian judge suc­
cessfully suing a satirical magazine for $75,000 in damages were 
$20,000; the magazine's fees $40,000.7 Fees for a personal injury action 
by a young model who miscarried at four months and suffered a facial 
scar due to a slip in a grocery store were $11.7 million of a $30 million 
damage award; disbursements for costs and expenses alone topped 
$750,000.8 Divorce litigation routinely costs those few who can afford 
it hundreds of thousands of dollars; for most litigants, it commands 
what wealth they do have.9 
Why do lawyers cost so much? Surprisingly, we have few insights 
into this basic question. Conventional popular culture has one sugges­
tion: lawyers are an avaricious lot who will bleed you dry.1° Conven­
tional economics has another: legal training is expensive.11 And con­
ventional professional wisdom has another: lawyers enjoy a state­
granted monopoly over which they control entry for the purposes of 
protecting the public. None of these is particularly compelling. While 
each seems to hold some grain of truth, each also raises more ques­
tions than it answers. How is it that the profession has come to be 
dominated by vice? Why is law so complicated that legal training is so 
expensive? Is the public better off with inexpensive low quality legal 
advice or high quality legal advice it cannot afford? 
The profession has long been both uneasy and defensive about its 
relationship to the market. Concerns about the commercialization of 
5. See Barry Meier, Lawyers in Early Tobacco Suits to Get $8 Billion, N.Y. 1iMES, Dec. 
12, 1998, at Al. The settlement with Florida was $13 billion; across the nation the total was 
$206 billion. 
6. See Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? 
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 431 (1989). 
7. See A. Mcilroy, "Franked!," GLOBE AND MAIL, May 22, 1999, at Dl. 
8. See Karen M. Zuckerman, Contingent Fee for All, TEX. LAW., 1998 SALARY & 
BILLING SURVEY (Apr. 6, 1998) <http://www.texlaw.com/special/salbi!Y040698r.htm>. 
9. See Virginia's No-Fault Divorce Reform Bill (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://patriot.net/ 
-crouch/artj/tvshow.html> (comments of John Crouch, Executive Director of Americans for 
Divorce Reform). 
10. Q. "What is the difference between a lawyer and a leech?" A. "A leech will let go 
and drop off when its victim dies." Canonical List of Lawyer Humor (Court Jester) (last 
modified Mar. 2, 1995) <http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/-atan/jokes/canonical_lawyer. 
html>. For a scholarly treatment of lawyer humor, see Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: 
The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
805 (1998). 
11. See Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215 (1992). 
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law practice date back almost as far as the profession itself,12 and cer­
tainly characterize the modern bar. The profession is entrusted with 
guardianship of the justice system, and so imbued with the qualities of 
public service, but it also primarily distributes its goods via commer­
cial, private markets. This dual role causes internal conflict in the pro­
fession. The American Bar Association's ("ABA") 1986 Commission 
on Professionalism, for example, saw the fundamental question of pro­
fessionalism to be, "Has our profession abandoned principle for profit, 
professionalism for commercialism?"13 
The relative inattention to the basic question of the economic 
causes of the high cost of legal services may, paradoxically, be pre­
cisely attributable to the fact that the relationship between the lawyers 
and the market is at the heart of modern conceptions of professional­
ism. As defined by the ABA's Commission on the Profession, for ex­
ample, the attributes of a "profession" are primarily found in its rela­
tion to the market: 
The profession receives special privileges from the state. 
Its practice requires substantial intellectual training. 
Clients must trust the professional because their lack of training prevents 
them from evaluating his or her work. 
The client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's self-interest is over­
balanced by devotion to serving both the client's interest and the public 
good. 
The profession is self-regulating.14 
By making the relationship between legal practice and the market 
constitutive of the "profession," definitions such as these cast that re­
lationship as a matter of professional ethics, not economics. Seen in 
this light, the high cost of legal services is a problem of virtue, not in­
centives: the very concept of professionalism requires that a disregard 
of economic incentives be a moral duty for the professional. Lawyers 
charge high fees only to the extent that they fail at their professional 
obligation to the public interest. Conversely, fees charged by ethical 
attorneys are not "high." 
The claim of "professionalism" in the relationship between the 
practice of law and the market is actually a series of linked normative 
claims derived from the basic fact of legal complexity. Law requires 
substantial intellectual training. It is therefore in the public interest 
that law be practiced only by those with such training. Only those 
with training can judge the capacity of others to practice and the qual-
12 See Robert M Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
13. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, ABA, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LA WYER PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1986). 
14. Id. at3. 
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ity of practice delivered to clients, and therefore entry into practice 
and regulation of practice is delegated to those with training. Set 
apart from the control of both the state and the market, the obligation 
then falls to the profession not to take advantage of the absence of ex­
ternal controls: to put public and client interest ahead of self-interest. 
The profession is first conceptualized and then justified as a practice 
apart from the market economy. 
But the practice of law is not apart from the economy. The con­
cept of a profession may set the practice apart as a normative ideal, 
but the structuring of the profession is still the structuring of a market. 
As the question, "Has the profession abandoned principle for profit?" 
suggests, it is not at all evident that practitioners, even highly ethical 
professionals, resist market incentives in any systematic way. The 
question then is, if practitioners are behaving as market actors, what 
kind of market is this? Is it competitive, in the sense that its prices re­
flect costs and competitive returns to an efficient use of resources such 
as training and human capital? Or are there systematic features of this 
market that lead to noncompetitive prices or that otherwise raise the 
cost of legal services to levels that should trigger concern? 
In this Article, I explore the economics of the market for lawyers 
and demonstrate its various noncompetitive features. Lawyers in fact 
face a string of powerful market incentives to charge fees above those 
that would emerge in a competitive market. As is typical of non­
competitive markets, the legal market results in prices being deter­
mined by the value placed on them by consumers, not the cost of pro­
viding the service. The allocation of lawyers' efforts are thereby 
skewed to those who place high monetary value on legal services and 
are able to pay these large sums: generally, commercial clients. The 
most troubling feature of these market incentives is not merely that 
the fees lawyers charge are high. It is that they are high because the 
market is fundamentally characterized by a bidding competition be­
tween commercial actors and individuals for access to scarce legal re­
sources. This is a competition commercial actors (more generally, or­
ganizations drawing on aggregations of wealth) overwhelmingly win 
because of the great disparity in resources between commer­
cial/organizational entities and individuals. Legal fees are high pre­
cisely because legal resources are, as a result of free market forces, 
pulled disproportionately into the commercial sphere, and individuals 
are largely priced out of the market. Only those individuals with 
claims on the resources of commercial entities (i.e., tort damages for 
injuries caused by corporate actors or products) and access to contin­
gency fee arrangements can compete for legal services. 
The distribution of legal services produced by the market for law­
yers is thus quite disturbing: organized as a self-regulating profession 
with guardianship of the public justice system, a system that lies at the 
heart of democratic social structure, the profession is propelled by 
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market forces to devote itself disproportionately to the management 
of the economic relationships of commerce and not the management 
of just relations among individuals and the state. 
In Part II, I sketch an empirical overview of the profession, focus­
ing on the data demonstrating a sharp cleavage in the profession be­
tween lawyers serving corporate clients and those serving individual 
clients, and a disproportionate allocation of lawyers to the corporate 
sphere. In Part ill, I catalogue the imperfections in the market for 
lawyers that lead the market to substantial departures from competi­
tive price and allocation. Based on this catalogue, I identify the three 
basic elements supporting the structure of the market for lawyers. 
These are: the complexity of law, the monopoly the state has over co­
ercive dispute resolution, and the unified nature of the profession. 
Each of these elements suggests an approach to policy reform to im­
prove the accessibility of the justice system, and the analysis as a 
whole raises deep philosophical questions about the nature of law and 
legal reasoning. In Part N, I briefly suggest some of the questions and 
solutions we need to explore to bring the legal system better into line 
with our aspirations for justice. 
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A. The Cost of Lawyers and Legal Services 
Average hourly rates for lawyers in the U.S. in 1998 were $180; 
large-firm partners averaged $250 an hour with the top ten percent 
earning over $385 an hour. The average lawyer billed over 7 hours a 
day.15 At these rates, and including expenses which are billed sepa­
rately (such as the cost of experts, paralegals, filing fees, court costs, 
transcript fees, photocopying, postage, long distance, and fax charges), 
any legal matter can cost tens of thousands of dollars in a matter of 
days. One experienced litigator estimates that it costs a minimum of 
$100,000 to litigate a straightforward business claim. 
For large corporations, the explosion in legal bills has led to a vari­
ety of efforts to contain costs: expanded in-house corporate counsel 
(approximately 10% of the profession is in-house), professional legal 
15. See Altman Weil, Inc., The 1998 Survey of Law Firm Economics (visited Nov. 1, 
1999) <http://www.altmanweil.com/publications/surveys/slfe/Section_Ol.htm>. Some caution 
is in order in interpreting this data. The sample, while large (over 10,000 lawyers and 400 
firms), is based on Altman Weil, Inc.'s clients and contacts. Altman Weil is a large consult­
ant to law firms. These clients, while they include small offices, are probably not representa­
tive of the smaller general practice or solo practitioner office serving individual clients. An­
ecdotal data from such firms suggest that rates of $150 are standard. See About Our Fees at 
Wolfe Legal Services, Ltd. (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.wolfelaw.com/ 
fees.htm>. 
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bill auditors to monitor for fraudulent billing or over-billing,16 market­
supplied software that mines a company's or industry's old legal bills 
to determine benchmarks for assessing incoming legal bills or estab­
lishing flat-fee agreements, unbundling services so that more stan­
dardized services, such as legal research, are contracted out, and 
awarding one firm a flat-fee contract to perform, for example, all the 
personal injury defense work that a large corporation has.17 
While these innovations have pressured large corporate law firms 
to increase efficiency, it remains true that hourly rates in corporate 
firms have continued to increase at between 3.6 to 7.3% per year in 
the later 1990s.18 More importantly, the costs of legal services, par­
ticularly from the perspective of the noncommercial client (for whom 
most of these techniques are unavailable and unworkable), are still 
phenomenal. One new cost-control technique is task-based billing, the 
rates for which speak volumes: the cost of a case evaluation and initial 
complaint is $6,000 if the stakes are under $150,000, $12,000 if they are 
over $2 million; the cost of a motion for summary judgment $18,000 
and $40,000, respectively. (Figure 1 reproduces a sample task-based 
fee schedule.)19 
FIGURE 1: LmGATION FLAT FEE SCHEDULE 
Size of Case 
Task Under $150,000 to $500,000to Over$2 
$150,000 $500,000 $2Million Million 
Case Evaluation and Initial Complaint 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Answer 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 
Written Discoverv Requests 900 1.200 1,500 1,800 
Response to Written Discovery 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,600 
Discoverv Motion 2,250 2,900 3,750 4,500 
Agreed Protective Order 600 800 1,000 1,200 
Personal Jurisdiction 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Venue Motion 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Motion for Continuance 450 600 750 1 000 
16. One study found that 92 % of lawyers either intentionally padded their bills or knew 
lawyers who did. See Stephen M. Voltz, Litigation Cost Control Resource Center (visited 
Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.Iegalfees.com>. A frequent form of overbilling is double-billing: 
billing two or more clients for the same work if both require it be done. Legal bill auditors 
estimate that 5% to 10% of bills include fraudulent charges. Overbilling and fraud have 
been uncovered at leading law firms in the past several years. See id. 
17. This was done by Chrysler in recent years. See Dan Shingler, Reminger Flat-Fee 
Billing Attracts Big-Time Clients, CRAIN's Cr.EV. Bus., Oct.16, 1995, at A2. 
18. See Hourly Billing Rates, TEX. LAW., 1999 SALARY AND BILLING SURVEY (Apr. 6, 
1998) <http://www.texlaw.com/special/salbill/032999aa.htm>. 
19. See Voltz, supra note 16. In 1995 the ABA, in consultation with in-house corporate 
attorneys and large corporate law firms, established a standardized approach to task defini­
tion and published the Uniform Task-Based Management System: Litigation Code Set. 
Canadian firms are following suit. 
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Size of Case 
Task Und;: $150,000 to $500,000: Over$2 
$150,0 $500,000 $2Millio Million 
Arbitration Motion 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Deposition Prep and Notice 450 600 750 1,000 
Response to Subpoena 300 400 500 600 
SUIIlIIlarvJudl!Jllent 18,000 24,000 30,000 40,000 
Scheduling Order 600 800 1,000 1,200 
Pretrial Order 4,500 6,000 7,500 9,000 
Status Conference 600 800 1,000 1,200 
Monthlv Budget/Strategy Conference 450 600 750 900 
Witness List 450 600 750 900 
Exhibit List 450 600 750 900 
Trial Brief 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Jurv Charge 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 
Drafting Findings/ Rulings 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 
Supplemental Discovery 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
Motion to Disaualifv 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Temporarv Restraining Order 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Preliminary Injunction 7,500 10,000 12,500 15,000 
Attachment 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 
Preparing Draft Orders 300 400 500 600 
PreoaringJudP111ent 600 800 1,000 1,200 
Third Partv Subpoena 450 600 750 900 
Motion to Withdraw 450 600 750 900 
Notice of Removal 750 1,000 1,250 1,500 
Motion to Remand 2,250 3,000 3,750 4,500 
Motion to Amend 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
EEOC/ MCAD Response 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Motion to Sever or Consolidate 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
Motion to Bifurcate 1,500 2.000 2,500 3,000 
Motion in Limine 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Motion for Directed Verdict 2,250 3,000 3,750 4,500 
Notice of Appeal 300 400 500 600 
JNOV Motion 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 
Motion for New Trial 4,500 6,000 7,500 9,000 
Appeal Brief 22,500 30,000 37,500 45,000 
Coordinate Exoert's Reoort 2,250 3,000 3,750 4,500 
Conduct Deposition 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 
Defend Deposition 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
Mediation 2,250 3,000 3,750 4,500 
Witness Interview 600 800 1,000 1,200 
Audit Resoonse (per matter) 150 200 250 300 
Settlement Documents 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
Review Client Documents 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
Review Opponent's 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 
Pretrial Conference 450 600 750 900 
Trial (per partner per dav) 2,000 
Trial preparation (per partner per day) 2,000 
If the stakes are monetary, the legal process is not worth the ex­
pense unless potential awards - and the resources available for an 
award - can cover these extraordinary costs. If the stakes are non-
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monetary - as they are in many cases involving individuals - legal 
process must be either foregone or paid for with whatever wealth the 
individual has. In Canada, the average individual who has contact 
with a lawyer has one instance of contact; approximately 1/3 never 
have contact with a lawyer. A 1994 ABA survey found that 61 % of 
moderate income respondents with legal problems had no interaction 
with the justice system. 20 In 1990 in the U.S., 52 % of families obtained 
their divorces without lawyers, and in 88% of litigated family law cases 
- generally the most frequent type of claim in courts21 - at least one 
party was unrepresented or defaulted.22 It is not unusual for those 
with little or no choice but to participate in legal process - those in 
disputes involving children, accused of crimes, seeking protection from 
violence, or named as civil defendants - to be impoverished by legal 
fees and/or forced to default. Only routine legal work seems afford­
able: $100 for a simple will, $350 for an uncontested divorce, $425 for 
an individual bankruptcy.23 
Free or subsidized services - legal aid, public interest, pro bona, 
and publicly provided legal services - account for a tiny fraction of 
legal effort. Approximately 10% of lawyers work in government. In 
the U.S. in 1988, however, only 1 % of lawyers were working as legal 
aid lawyers or public defenders. The revenues of legal aid societies 
are less than 1 % of the total revenues to legal services nationwide, in 
both the U.S. and Canada. The total funding to public interest firms 
in the U.S., at its peak, was less than one-half of one percent of total 
revenues: $35 to 50 million.24 Only about 10% of U.S. lawyers par­
ticipate in bar-run pro bona programs. A 1985 ABA study showed 
that only 20% of U.S. lawyers donated more than 1 hour a week (50 
hours/year) to pro bona work; in the early 70s, a peak time for social 
activism, the average among the 2/3rds of lawyers who did any pro 
bono work was 27 hours per year (30 minutes a week).25 The self-
20. See ROY w. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, ABA, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG Low­
lNCOME AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE 
COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994). 
21. See Ministry of the Attorney General Ontario Canada, Court Statistics Annual Re­
port: Fiscal Year 199711998 2-6 (Toronto: Ministry of Attorney General Program Develop­
ment Branch, 1998). 
22 See STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, ABA, 
RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE LmGANT (1994). 
23. See Legg Law Firm, L.L.C., Fee Schedule: Service Fees (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http:// 
www.legglaw.com>. 
24. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LA WYERS (1989); KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED 
FROM JUSTICE: THE ABUSE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY DIVORCE LAWYERS AND 
JUDGES (1996). 
25. See ABEL, supra note 24. 
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reported average for lawyers in Ontario is 20 hours per year; 75% re­
ported 0 hours for 1998.26 
B. The Allocation of Resources Across Business and Personal Clients 
The high average cost of legal services hides a deeper and even 
more troubling phenomenon: the overwhelmingly commercial focus 
of our legal system. The largest firms serve almost exclusively corpo­
rate clients. The most successful, influential, and creative lawyers pre­
dominantly (although not exclusively) serve corporate clients. The 
vast majority of elite law school graduates end up serving corporate 
clients. Commercial clients command a huge fraction of legal effort, 
effectively squeezing the interests of individuals, particularly their 
most precious and democratically vital interests, to the margins. 
In their landmark study, Chicago Lawyers, Heinz and Laumann 
first documented in 1975 the striking degree of differentiation in the 
legal profession between those who serve business clients and those 
who serve personal clients.27 From a survey of the Chicago bar, they 
concluded that the profession is divided into two hemispheres. The 
corporate28 sphere is characterized by large firms populated by elite 
law school graduates who are well-connected and influential in the 
profession. These lawyers serve business clients on business matters 
and engage in complex transactions and litigation, work that is per­
ceived (by those who do it as well as those who do not) as high pres­
tige. They charge high hourly fees and enjoy high annual incomes. 
The personal client segment of the market is characterized by solo 
practitioners or small general practice/slightly specialized firms serving 
personal clients on personal and small business matters. The work is 
of two predominant types. Most is routine, noncontested legal work 
such as house closings, noncontested divorces, simple wills and estate 
planning, simple incorporations, tenant evictions, and so on. Non­
routine litigation work is predominantly personal injury litigation 
done on contingency basis; some litigation work is done on a signifi­
cant hourly fee (sometimes as high as the fee charged in the large firm 
segment) for wealthier individuals in family law or, less frequently, 
other matters. Lawyers in this segment tend to be graduates of non­
elite institutions, to be less well connected and influential in the pro-
26. Unpublished statistics from the 1998 Member Information Form data collected from 
all practicing lawyers in Ontario by the Law Society of Upper Canada (regulatory body for 
Ontario). 
27. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL 
STRUCTURE OFTiiE BAR (1982). 
28. I use the term "corporate" here and throughout the paper to mean any business in­
terest, including partnerships. 
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fession, and earn lower incomes. Their work is perceived, by lawyers 
in both sectors, as lower prestige.29 
In 1975 the term "hemisphere" was barely accurate: 53% of legal 
effort was devoted to the corporate sphere30 and 40% to the personal 
sphere.31 Of the personal sphere, just half - 21 % of the total work 
done by the Chicago bar - was devoted to what Heinz and Laumann 
called "personal plight": civil rights, family, immigration, employ­
ment, plaintiff personal injury, criminal defense, and so on. The re­
mainder was small business and personal business work done for indi­
viduals: income tax, real estate, estate planning, and so on. These 
numbers were roughly the same as early estimates of the breakdown 
of legal effort in the U.S. as a whole.32 
These 1975 numbers are striking enough, but when the Chicago 
study was redone in 1995 the numbers were downright alarming. The 
share of legal effort going to corporate clients increased to 61 %. Total 
effort devoted to personal clients fell to 29%. The "personal plight" 
segment accounted for a mere 16% of total legal effort.33 
The personal sector is increasingly marginalized within the profes­
sion. Income inequality in the profession has increased substantially 
over the last few decades. In this sector, incomes and fees have either 
remained stable or decreased slightly with a perceived glut of lawyers 
and un/underemployment. The business sector has become honey­
combed by specialization; incomes and fees have increased over the 
past decades with a perceived shortage of lawyers. Law now has the 
highest income inequality of the professions.34 Also over the last few 
decades, artificial barriers to entry such as restrictions on the number 
of law school places, advertising prohibitions, and bar-established fee 
schedules have disappeared or diminished substantially. Simultane­
ously the number of lawyers has risen dramatically, and firm size in 
the corporate sphere has exploded, while the fraction of legal re­
sources devoted to the personal sphere - the theoretical core of the 
justice system as opposed to the legal system - has dwindled at a 
rapid rate.35 
29. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 27. 
30. These figures include in "corporate" all organizational clients, including govern-
ment. These latter client types are a small fraction. 
31. The remainder is work for government, nonprofits, law schools, and so on. 
32 See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 27. 
33. See John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 
1975and1995, 32 L. & SOC'Y REV. 751 {1998). 
34. See Sander & Williams, supra note 6. 
35. Marc Galanter has long emphasized the dominance of organizational clients in the 
legal system. See MARC GALANIER, WHY TIIB HAVES COME Our AHEAD {1974); Marc 
Galanter, Planet of the AP's [Artificial Persons]: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its 
Users {Oct. 11, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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In the Part that follows, I examine the economic features of the 
market for lawyers in an effort to account for this striking picture of 
the justice system. With the empirical data on the makeup of the sys­
tem and the allocation of lawyers across business and personal clients, 
across economic and personal matters, the question becomes not 
merely, why do lawyers earn so much, but rather, how did we end up 
with a system that looks like this? 
III. THE ECONOMICS OF THE MARKET FOR LA WYERS 
AND LEGAL SERVICES 
As I have already suggested, the allocation of legal services to the 
commercial sector is due to the noncompetitive nature of the market, 
which places the emphasis on the wealth of clients rather than on the 
cost of services. In this Part, I catalogue six different features of the 
market for lawyers and legal services that can be expected to lead to 
high fees and hence the commercial orientation of law. All are struc­
tural attributes that cause the market to deviate from the conditions of 
perfect competition. It will be helpful, then, to begin with a brief 
summary of the idea of perfect competition and its importance to an 
economic analysis of the provision of legal services. 
My objective is, in the first instance, to do a positive economic 
analysis of the determination of prices in the market for lawyers. Posi­
tive analysis, however, has immediate normative implications. The 
economic framework for analyzing the operation of markets is essen­
tially comparative: we assess the extent to which the market deviates 
from the hypothetical benchmark of "perfect competition." The per­
fectly competitive market is one in which goods are distributed by 
sellers with no ability to influence market price to buyers with no abil­
ity to influence market price under conditions of full information. 
Price is equal to marginal cost, and output is the quantity demanded at 
that price. 
The reason "perfectly competitive" markets are of interest is be­
cause the theorems of welfare economics demonstrate that such mar­
kets result in the maximization of consumer welfare: in a sense, prices 
are as low as they can be, and output is as high as it can be, given the 
technological constraints on production and the configuration of pref­
erences across the economy. We may wish prices were lower or out­
put higher, but this is the best we can do given the distribution and 
scarcity of resources. If there are unacceptable features of the result­
ing market price and output, recourse must be had to redistribution, 
rather than restructuring of the market to "squeeze" more from it. In 
terms of the market for legal services, if the market is perfectly com­
petitive its high prices are a fact of economic life. If access to legal 
services is unacceptable under these prices, the solution is subsidiza­
tion and/or public provision of services. 
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Markets that depart from the perfectly competitive benchmark, on 
the other hand, are markets that we cannot assume achieve the best 
we can do. Once we leave the terrain of the perfectly competitive 
market (or, more reasonably, the largely perfectly competitive mar­
ket), we have to look more closely at the operation of the imperfect 
market and the possibility of intervention to correct market failures. 
If we can identify structural features responsible for market failures, 
we can examine possible 'fixes.' Hence the plan of the analysis in this 
Article is to catalogue the ways in which the market for legal services 
deviates from the perfectly competitive market, and then to examine 
what structural response we might make in order to improve the ac­
cessibility of legal services. I conclude this Part, then, with a discus­
sion of the links between each of the market failures I catalogue and 
what I identify as the basic components of the market: a monopoly 
over coercive dispute resolution, the complexity of law, and the uni­
fied nature of the profession. 
A. Complexity: The Cost of Complex Reasoning and Process 
Lawyers are expensive, in the first instance, when what they do is 
complex and requires sophisticated and careful reasoning and the ex­
ercise of thoughtful judgment. Competence in law often requires ex­
tensive training.36 As Sherwin Rosen has noted, this explanation for 
the high cost of legal services goes back to Adam Smith: "High wages 
in a profession are necessary to compensate an entrant when great ex­
penses must be incurred for learning its trade. "37 
This account of the high price of lawyers appears quite benign, the 
product of competitive market forces: price equals cost. And indeed 
the fact of legal complexity and the cost of legal training plainly are a 
basis for legal expense in many cases. There are a few pieces of the 
complexity argument that we need to examine more closely, however, 
in order to see the problem with a straightforward claim that the cost 
of lawyers is simply the result of competitive market mechanisms and 
hence, in a sense, just a fact of economic life. 
To begin, it is important to remember that legal costs are (usually) 
the product of hourly legal fees and the number of hours a lawyer de­
votes to a matter. Even where lawyers charge flat or contingency fees, 
these fees generally average out over a portfolio of cases to a compa­
rable rate per hour charged on a noncontingency basis.38 Legal fees 
may be high then for one or both of two reasons: hourly rates are high 
36. This is not to say that there are not things that lawyers currently do that could be 
done as well, if not better, by individuals with less or different training. 
37. Rosen, supra note 11, at 216. 
38. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 290-303 {1998). 
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and/or the number of hours devoted to a matter are high. Suppose the 
number of hours required by a matter was fixed by the principles of 
justice in the same way that we conceive the number of hours for a 
medical procedure to be largely fixed by biology.39 With hours fixed 
by "necessity," perfect competition in the market for lawyers would 
then lead to entry up to the point at which the hourly rate produced an 
income compensating lawyers for the investment in legal training. 
But the hours required to resolve a legal matter are not fixed by 
abstract and immutable principles of justice. They are determined by 
procedures and reasoning requirements established and implemented 
by members of the profession (lawyers and judges and legislators) in 
an antagonistic, interactive process. From an economic point of view 
it then makes sense to ask whether the amount of time required to re­
solve a matter - essentially the complexity of the relevant law and 
procedure - is optimal: is the value obtained by an increase in com­
plexity justified by the cost of increased lawyer time? This question 
has to be asked not only of a particular case,40 but, more importantly, 
of the system as a whole. 
By "complexity" I mean not only the intellectual subtlety of legal 
rules but also the mass of factors and contingencies which must or 
could be considered in determining legal strategies, arguments, and 
expectations. As the complexity of law and procedure increases, the 
total cost of resolving a matter goes up, and hence fewer disputes and 
claims (that is, fewer people) have access to law and lawyers. There is 
no reason to think, however, that even a perfectly competitive market 
for lawyers will result in the optimal level of complexity in the system 
as a whole. 
Consider first the role of judges. Judges, both directly through 
their rulings on procedural matters (which, incidentally, are a high 
fraction of rulings )41 and indirectly through their rulings on substantive 
law, play a dominant role in the evolution of complexity in procedure. 
Procedural rulings can obviously extend the time it takes to resolve a 
matter by allowing more extensive discovery, by granting latitude for 
lengthy filings or hearings, and so on. Less obviously, both procedural 
39. Medical experts, and critics, will no doubt want to object that the complexity of a 
procedure is also a function of technology and ideology, but my point is only to draw a clear 
reference point 
40. There is a growing literature on the economics of civil procedure which looks at this 
question in particular. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal-Economic Analysis of Com­
parative Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 905 (1997). 
41. In one sample of filings in Ontario courts, almost one-third of matters were proce­
dural in nature, seeking, for example, rulings on discovery or case scheduling. (Data on file 
with author). 
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and substantive rulings will over time tend, generically, to expand the 
specialized legal knowledge required to resolve a matter.42 
This latter tendency is a result of the nature of legal reasoning. In 
any system of law committed to precedent, whether as a matter of 
principle or pragmatism, the art of legal reasoning and decision is the 
art of drawing out distinctions and similarities between cases. Brilliant 
lawyering is the art of drawing out and then persuading others of the 
salience of distinctions and/or similarities that were not previously 
recognized. This implies that there is a natural entropy to legal com­
plexity.43 As legal rules become increasingly refined in a given area, or 
unified across previously disparate bodies of law, more facts and/or 
more legal doctrines become relevant: research needs to go up, proc­
ess needs to go up, and analysis needs to go up. All this takes time. 
The relevant economic questions are: How do judges decide when 
and to what extent to increase the complexity (cost) of resolving legal 
issues? What incentives or considerations guide their decisions? Do 
their decisions make optimal tradeoffs between the benefits of com­
plexity and the costs of complexity? 
Probably not. From a strictly self-interest point of view, these as­
sessments are made by individuals who, for the most part, do not bear 
the cost of the resulting procedure. Standard economic analysis would 
thus not predict optimal decisionmaking. Moreover, again drawing on 
standard economics, even if judges bore the cost of procedure for the 
decisions they make, because of precedent, these decisions have a 
public good and a public bad quality about them. The procedures es­
tablished in a given case become part of the body of law available to 
all in the jurisdiction. The impact on others is not taken into account 
by a self-interested decisionmaker, and so optimal tradeoffs are not 
reached. 
The standard economic model of pure self-interest is, however, not 
a particularly appealing model of judicial conduct. Individuals are ca­
pable of ethical conduct - resisting self-interest - and judicial legiti­
macy in society depends on there being some confidence that judges 
behave ethically, even if not perfectly so. But even the most highly 
ethical judge, the one who is a paragon of professionalism in the sense 
of looking only to public interest in judgment, will not make the opti-
42. Striking evidence of this was found in the RAND lnstitute's evaluation of the impact 
of the Federal Civil Justice Reform Act's efforts to reduce the time and cost of federal pro­
cedure. The study found that establishing discovery controls increased the amount of legal 
effort required to resolve a matter. Lawyers now had to become familiar with the new 
"streamlined" procedures and prepare filings and strategy in relation to those procedures. 
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF 
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CrvrL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 16-17, 26-27 
(1996). 
43. See Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
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mal tradeoff between the benefits and costs of complexity in substan­
tive law and procedure. 
The reason is precisely because of his or her commitment to pro­
fessional ethics. These ethics, for judges in particular, require that de­
cisions be based on legal rules and principles. When asked to rule on 
whether a given rule is best understood to apply or not to a given set 
of facts - to rule on the relevance of a distinction proffered by coun­
sel - the ethical judge responds within the terms of the legal reasons 
at hand. Does due process require live testimony, or can testimony be 
given by videotape? What if the witness is a child? A victim of abuse? 
A great distance away? A president? Even if the cost of live testi­
mony versus videotaped testimony is a legitimate legal consideration, 
it is rare that the cost of the complexity of the distinctions introduced 
into the law generally is taken into account. In many, many cases it 
would be seen as positively wrong for a judge to agree, for example, 
that justice requires the admission of videotaped evidence in particular 
circumstances and then, on the grounds of controlling the complexity 
of legal distinctions, to nonetheless exclude the evidence and conse­
quently convict the defendant whose only defense is on videotape. It 
is the nature of our system of justice, which develops law for the juris­
diction generally through decisions that must be justified in a particu­
lar case, that individual considerations will systematically dominate 
the attention of the court. It is the very essence of our system of legal 
reasoning that the terms of decisionmaking are tuned to the assess­
ment of whether these circumstances differ from those in some way, 
whether this legal rule applies in light of these particular facts. That 
this sensitivity to the differences between cases renders the law com­
plex and hence more costly, and therefore less accessible to those not 
before the court, is a consideration that is, if not out of bounds, clearly 
subordinate. 
It is even unlikely that judges could, with an enlarged sense of the 
tradeoffs between justice in a given case and justice for those who may 
never get their day in court because of the cost of participating in 
complex legal proceedings, determine the optimal tradeoff. Given the 
decentralized nature of judicial decisionmaking and the generally mi­
nute incremental effect of individual decisions, there would be little 
but abstract guessing to guide the judge who endeavoured to make the 
tradeoff. And even the most sophisticated statistician of a judge 
would be unlikely to get the tradeoff right: as I have explored else­
where in connection with questioning the claim that the substantive 
rules of the common law evolve to efficiency,44 the information con­
straints on judges make such decisionmaking impossible.45 
44. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 493-99 (3d ed. 1986). 
45. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 
(1992). 
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Thus even the best, most ethical, judges are unlikely to produce a 
body of law that results in a level of complexity that, like the produc­
tion of goods in a competitive market, optimally balances the costs 
and benefits of increasing the amount of lawyers' time necessary to re­
solve a legal matter. 
When we move to consider the role of individual lawyers in the de­
termination of how much time is necessary, the prospects for optimal 
complexity become even more dismal. Lawyers face much stronger 
incentives than do judges to behave in accordance with the standard 
economic model of self-interest. Undoubtedly there are lawyers who 
drag out the time devoted to a matter.46 More important than such 
deliberate bill-padding, however, is again the fact that the ethical law­
yer will disregard the impact of particular arguments or strategies on 
the complexity and hence the cost of law as a whole. Commitment to 
zealous advocacy will indeed demand, or can at least be understood to 
demand, that the lawyer disregard such considerations. It does not 
hurt, of course, that ethically sanctioned willful blindness is profitable. 
For all these reasons then, even if the rate of return on the invest­
ment in legal training is determined by a perfectly competitive market, 
as economists such as Rosen suggest, we cannot conclude that the cost 
of lawyers is just the competitively determined cost of complex law. 
The complexity of law, and hence both the amount of time devoted to 
a matter and the extent of legal training required, is the product of a 
host of factors that disregard the costs and benefits of complexity for 
law as a whole. 
We can think of the above impact of complexity on the cost of le­
gal services as a direct effect: complexity raises costs because it in­
creases the amount of legal effort necessary to resolve a dispute or 
claim. In the rest of this list of factors that lead to high legal fees, I 
move on to the indirect effects of complexity. 
B. Credence Goods: The Role of Uncertainty 
Economists refer to a good as a credence good if it is provided by 
an expert who also determines the buyer's needs.47 Buyers of cre­
dence goods are unable to assess how much of the good or service they 
need; nor can they assess whether or not the service was performed or 
how well. This puts buyers at risk of opportunistic behavior on the 
part of sellers: they may be sold too much of a service or billed for 
services not performed or performed poorly. Theoretical work on 
markets for credence goods predicts that markets for credence goods 
may be characterized by fraud (billing for unnecessary services or 
46. See Voltz, supra note 16. 
47. See, e.g., Michael A. Darby & Edi Kami, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount 
of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 {1973). 
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services not performed) and a price mark-up over cost.48 Empirical 
work supports these predictions: in one study of automobile repair 
shops, for example, it was found that 90% of testers were recom­
mended unnecessary repairs. 49 
Legal services are credence goods. The sheer complexity of law 
makes it difficult for clients to judge the service they are receiving. 
This much is well understood by the profession, as the ABA definition 
from the 1986 Commission on Professionalism50 makes plain. Profes­
sional ethics recognizes that as a consequence of the inability of clients 
to judge lawyers' performance, lawyers are obligated to act on the ba­
sis of their clients' interests and not their own. Whether ethical con­
straints in fact substantially constrain lawyers from responding to the 
incentive to misrepresent the need for services or the quality or quan­
tity of services performed is another matter. The low regard in which 
lawyers are popularly held suggests that many people do not believe 
lawyers are above fraudulent behavior: "Q. How can you tell when a 
lawyer is lying? A. His lips are moving."51 That the free market re­
sults in some such behavior is evidenced more concretely by the fact 
that clients are willing to spend money on the services of another law­
yer to review legal bills. In-house corporate counsel oversee the cost­
effectiveness of time spent by outside lawyers on a corporation's legal 
matters. There are also independent "watchdog" services available in 
the market to assess legal bills on an as-needed basis. 
The real problem for the market for legal services comes not, how­
ever, from a failure of professional ethics to constrain fraudulent bill­
ing, but rather from the failure of professional ethics even to reach the 
deeper credence characteristic of legal services. Law is not merely 
complex. It is so complex that it is also highly ambiguous and unpre­
dictable. The necessity and quality of legal services are not merely dif­
ficult for nonexperts to judge; they are also difficult for experts, even 
the expert providing the service, to judge. This magnifies the credence 
problem dramatically. 
The complexity of law reflects the amorphous and multi-faceted 
nature of human conflict and conflict resolution. Law is sensitive to 
context and to the multiple factors that must be weighed in reaching a 
decision on a case. Law is a result of human judgment and communi-
48. See Asher Wolinsky, Competition in Markets for Credence Goods, 151 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 117 {1995); see also Winand Emons, Credence and 
Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON. 107 {1997) (showing existence of nonfraudulent 
equilibria under certain conditions). 
49. See Gregory A. Patterson, Sears's Brennan Accepts Blame for Auto Flap, WALL ST. 
J., June 23, 1992, at Bl; see also Ernest Holsendolph, Faulty Car Repairs Found Widespread, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1979, at Al (citing U.S. Department of Transportation study finding 
53% of service charges were for unnecessary repairs). 
50. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
51. Canonical List of Lawyer Humor (Court Jester), supra note 10. 
970 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:953 
cation, processes that are subject to influence by a multitude of con­
siderations - idiosyncrasies, past experience, personal values, time, 
cognitive biases and limitations, politics, and so on. The process of re­
solving anything other than a routine legal matter involves many cu­
mulative effects resulting from a cascade of judgments, large and small 
- what evidence to produce, how to craft pleadings or contractual 
language, what tone of voice to adopt in testimony or argument or ne­
gotiation, how cooperative or combative to be in response to other 
parties, how quickly to push for a decision, how much to spend on re­
search or outside experts, and so on. 
As a result of this sensitivity to detail and differences, law is also 
highly unpredictable. This makes it extremely difficult for anyone, in­
cluding other lawyers, to judge whether the time spent on a case was 
honestly and carefully determined - whether the work performed on 
a case was the result of care and skill. It is also difficult to systemati­
cally study the effectiveness of legal services. Outcomes are ambigu­
ous: did the project succeed because the contract was well negotiated 
and drafted, or in spite of the contract? Did the plaintiff \vin because 
of the lawyering or in spite of it? What particular lawyering decisions 
did, and did not, contribute to the outcome? Legal malpractice stan­
dards reflect this: lawyers will be held legally accountable for failing 
to file documents within statutory time limits or for mishandling funds, 
but their judgments will not be "second-guessed." Lawyers' judg­
ments are insulated from review in a way that doctors' judgments, for 
example, are not. Relatedly, providers of legal services will generally 
provide no assurances about either outcome (except indirectly 
through contingency fees) or the amount of time that a matter will 
take; that the market for legal services is so overwhelmingly charac­
terized by the absence of flat rates is evidence of this. 
As a consequence, the market for legal services is even more fun­
damentally disrupted than is ordinarily the case for credence goods. 
There is no way for ordinary competitive mechanisms to operate ef­
fectively when it is difficult to assess and therefore compare the serv­
ices offered by competing providers. The competitive "fixes" one 
finds in markets for other credence goods - such as the separation of 
diagnosis and repair - operate only on the margins in law. Outside 
experts such as in-house counsel or market-provided "watchdog" 
services can only identify obvious abuses of the use of time or re­
sources; the ambiguity of law makes more extensive assessment im­
possible. Even self-assessment is difficult: the lawyer in many cases is 
only left with conjecture about what he or she might have done differ­
ently and whether it would have made a difference in the outcome. 
The difficulty of assessing lawyers' performance can be overstated. 
The "impossibility" of holding lawyers accountable for their judg­
ments is, of course, not an unwelcome fact for the legal profession. 
Professional platitudes such as, "litigation is always a crap shoot" or 
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"give a problem to 10 different lawyers and you'll get 11 different an­
swers" insulate individual lawyers and the profession as a whole. 
While there is truth to the claim that law is unpredictable, lawyers 
have no collective interest in parsing this claim. It is likely that law­
yers could be held more accountable than they are, more accountable 
than existing professional norms hold them. Nonetheless, we have to 
expect that the market for their services will deviate substantially from 
the hypothetical benchmark of perfect competition. 
Consider how competition is likely to work in a market character­
ized by extreme uncertainty about the value of the service. In order to 
keep the ideas here separate from others I explore in Sections below, 
suppose things worked roughly as follows. Suppose that, in fact, all 
lawyers have the same capacity to influence legal outcomes, but that 
clients believe lawyers differ substantially in their ability to secure 
good results. Potential clients visit lawyers' offices and describe their 
legal problems. Lawyers quote a flat rate for the service and describe 
how they expect to perform the service. Clients then choose lawyers, 
and lawyers choose the number of hours they will devote to their mat­
ters and the quality of work they will do. Once clients have been 
quoted a fee, they have to determine whether they think they would 
do better to go to another lawyer for another quote. 
The uncertainty about whether the current lawyer will do good and 
necessary work and the uncertainty about whether an alternative law­
yer would do good and necessary work, leaves the client who is quoted 
a price that seems "high" but not above the client's ability and willing­
ness to pay52 in a difficult position. What reason does the client have 
for going to another lawyer? The client will be thrown back upon her 
beliefs about quality. If she believes the alternative lawyer is higher 
quality, then there's a reason to go. But if she believes the other law­
yer is lower quality - a position she will ultimately be in if she keeps 
moving to lawyers she judges to be of higher quality - then what? 
How can the client assess the tradeoff? Whatever tradeoff she can as­
sess will be completely determined by her (spurious) beliefs about 
quality: the lawyer believed to be of higher quality can charge a 
higher price. And, indeed, the very fact of charging the higher price 
may raise the client's estimate of his quality. Another lawyer may try 
to woo the client away with a lower price but will have no way of 
proving that he offers representation of comparable quality. All he 
can do is to try to manipulate the client's beliefs about quality which, I 
assume, were not based on fact but rather on spurious indicia. Hence 
competition shifts to the production of such indicia (whatever they 
might be - representation of high profile or wealthy clients, win/loss 
52. Economists speak of this as the client's "reservation price." If the value to the client 
of the legal service when performed well is, say, $1,000, then the client's reservation price is 
$1,000. 
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records,s3 expensive art work, academic credentials, tough talk, punc­
tuality,54 hours of work), and price is governed by clients' beliefs and 
willingness to pay, not by the cost of the service. 
The basic point is that because it is so difficult to get information 
about the actual value of a lawyer - the extent to which a given law­
yer increases the likelihood or magnitude of a good outcome for a cli­
ent - the competitive mechanism works poorly if at all. So long as 
clients believe lawyers differ in quality - and in fact lawyers do, it is 
just very difficult to objectively determine when and how much -
prices will be buffeted by beliefs based on signals of quality that are 
more or less spurious. The extent to which a lawyer can extract the 
highest price a client is willing to pay - the monopoly price - will 
depend on the strength of beliefs generated in a world where it is ex­
tremely difficult to test those beliefs. 
C. Winner-Take-All: The Tournament of Superstars 
It might seem that the difficulty of attributing legal outcomes to 
the quality of lawyering and so differentiating among lawyers would 
lead to a situation in which clients, recognizing the difficulties, are 
willing to pay only small premiums for lawyers they believe to be "bet­
ter." If that were the case, high prices could be undercut by lawyers 
clients believed to be slightly less good but considerably cheaper. But 
the market for lawyers does not work this way. Here's why. 
Legal work is conducted in a tournament-style setting.ss What this 
means is that the impact of a lawyer on a legal outcome is a function 
not of the absolute quality of the lawyer, but of the lawyer's quality 
relative to the lawyers on the other side (including the judge). This is 
most clearly evident in the case of litigation. Litigation in an Anglo­
American regime is an adversarial contest. Success goes to the litigant 
who is most persuasive on his or her view of the facts and the law. A 
lawyer who has a good command of the relevant case law is nonethe­
less bested by a lawyer or judge who has a better command. An advo­
cate with good logical and rhetorical skills is vulnerable to the cut and 
thrust of another with even sharper wit. The process of litigation is a 
series of strategic moves and countermoves: sophisticated moves re­
quire even more sophisticated responses. Although it is extremely dif-
53. Under the assumption that all lawyers are in fact identical, win/loss records reflect 
only the nature of the cases a lawyer ended up with, not the performance of the lawyer. 
54. Customer feedback on pre-paid legal plans indicates that the most frequent concerns 
raised about legal providers are about characteristics such as politeness, punctuality, and 
returning phone calls. 
55. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF TiiE BIG LAW FIRM 98-110 {1991); see also Ronald J. Gilson & 
Robert H. :Mnookin, Coming of Age in the Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associ­
ate Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567 {1989). 
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ficult to assess exactly which moves or arguments or case citations or 
questions on cross-examination "determined" the result - this is what 
the deep unpredictability and credence quality of law is all about - it 
is clear that whatever effect lawyers have on the outcome is a function 
of performance in a given case relative to the performance of the other 
lawyers in the room. 
Although it is less obvious, the same is true of transactional legal 
work. Take the negotiation of a joint venture agreement as an exam­
ple. The distinctive role of lawyers in this setting is to structure the 
agreement so as to promote the interests of their respective clients; 
this is done in the shadow of potential litigation in the event that con­
flict erupts once the agreement is signed. The skillful lawyer will seek, 
for example, to promote his or her client's negotiating position by 
limiting the disclosure of negative information, skating a line between 
legitimate silence and misrepresentation. The lawyer on the other side 
will seek to be one step ahead: challenging the interpretation of dis­
closure and misrepresentation doctrine, figuring out what questions to 
ask, representations to seek, and documents to demand in order to de­
feat or exploit ambiguities in the law. The lawyers will also seek to 
outfox each other with contract language; in the event of later litiga­
tion, the client of the lawyer who missed the potential significance of a 
phrase or provision pays the price. Again, the process is a series of 
moves and countermoves; staying one step ahead of the other side is 
the name of the game. 
What makes the relativity of performance so important is the fact 
that this is a tournament - the winner takes the prize. Having a law­
yer who is marginally better pays off disproportionately. Conversely, 
entrusting your case to a lawyer who is likely to be outperformed, 
even if only slightly, can cost you the case. As a result, the difference 
in value between a lawyer who is good and one who is marginally bet­
ter can be very large. Clients are therefore (rationally) willing to pay a 
lot for a little.56 
Robert Frank has called markets in which small differences in rela­
tive quality result in large differences in price "winner-take-all" mar­
kets.57 These markets are characterized by high stakes: small differ­
ences in quality result in large differences in rewards. There can be a 
number of reasons why a market becomes structured in this way. 
Frank's prime examples of "winner-take-all" markets are the markets 
for entertainers and athletes. There may be tiny, objectively insignifi­
cant differences between the winner of an international piano compe-
56. Settlement outcomes will reflect the risk of these win-lose possibilities. Having a 
slightly better lawyer, because it produces a jump in the probability of winning, also pro­
duces a jump in settlement amounts. 
57. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PlilLIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 2-5 
(1995). 
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tition and the runner-up, but in a world in which everyone can listen to 
the winner's performances on CD, the difference in earnings is tre­
mendous. Similarly, the advertising endorsement fees paid to a gold 
medal winner from the Olympic Games far exceed those of the silver 
medalist. In these cases, the nonrivalrous nature of musical recordings 
or advertising images accounts for the disproportionate rewards: my 
listening to Pavarotti or watching Michael Jordan does not diminish 
your ability to do likewise. This is the result of technology: the num­
ber of potential consumers is vastly greater than in the days when per­
formances could only be heard or seen by the number of people who 
could fit into a concert hall or stadium. The high returns to the win­
ners in these markets then result from the sheer volume of consumers 
to whom the winners' performance can be sold. 
Legal markets might seem an unlikely candidate for winner-take­
all dynamics because, unlike Frank's primary examples, there are ob­
vious limits on the number of clients for whom a lawyer can perform. 
Some evidence that legal markets are nonetheless driven by these dy­
namics comes from the dramatic increase in the size of law firms over 
the past two decades and the tendency for reputations for quality to 
attach to the firm as opposed to individual practitioners. As Galanter 
and Palay have argued, the large law firm allows more lawyers to 
share in the human capital and reputation of successful lawyers; indi­
vidual partners can act for a larger number of clients when substantial 
portions of the work are delegated to junior colleagues; the strategic 
lessons of litigation or contract drafting or client management can be 
passed down in the firm's records and culture. Knowledge, like musi­
cal and athletic performances, is a nonrivalrous good as far as the 
firm's clients are concerned, even if it is put to rivalrous use. 
The potential sharing of legal performance among a large number 
of clients is, however, not the only feature of legal markets that subject 
them to winner-take-all dynamics. High levels of uncertainty about 
the quality of a performance in a setting of high stakes can also be re­
sponsible for these dynamics. Frank discusses the incentives of the 
corporate manager in selecting, for example, an outside consulting 
firm for marketing advice. In a fast-paced, highly competitive global 
market where the payoff for a successful advertising campaign can be 
enormous - and so too the cost of losing - managers are likely to be 
motivated to "go with the best." Doing so protects them from being 
an easy target for blame in the event the campaign is a failure. In a 
world of great uncertainty and high stakes, sometimes the best you can 
do is minimize your chances of regret. 
So again the uncertainty of law is a key determinant of the working 
of the market for lawyers. Some missteps in lawyering can be enor­
mously costly, but it is very difficult on the margin to predict which 
steps will turn out to be missteps. This is precisely why lawyers will 
always refuse to give guarantees: even in hindsight it is hard to tell 
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what turned the tide, and even best efforts to choose the most prom­
ising course can prove disastrous. Against this uncertainty, the best a 
client can do in selecting a lawyer is to choose the best she can afford. 
It is simply too difficult to calculate what the cost of choosing a lesser 
lawyer might be. The type of rational consumer behavior that drives 
ordinary market competition is simply not possible. Rationality re­
quires choice among options that can be compared. When all you 
have is a ranking of lawyers, with no information about just how much 
the outcomes obtained by lawyers within the ranking might vary, the 
only rational58 response is to choose the lawyer you believe to be the 
best whose fees you are willing to pay. 
To the extent the indicia on which clients base their rankings are 
public and common as opposed to personal and idiosyncratic, individ­
ual lawyers or firms will emerge as tournament winners, with the abil­
ity to essentially auction their services among potential clients.59 And 
it is reasonable to suppose that for the most part the indicia that po­
tential clients look at are indeed public and shared. Against the back­
drop of the knowledge that lawyers do differ in their ability to influ­
ence legal outcomes but the near impossibility of objectively assessing 
those differences, potential clients are likely to search for significance 
in whatever information is publicly available about the performance of 
a prospective lawyer. They will interpret signals - such as firm size 
and location, yellow-pages or television advertising, representation of 
celebrities - with reference to the public meaning of these signals. 
They will, rationally, look for widely shared indicia of quality because 
doing so in effect pools the information of disparate clients. In a set­
ting of extreme uncertainty, the public beliefs that emerge may be 
deeply flawed, but they are at least the result of an aggregation of ex­
periences, each of which contains a tiny bit of data. 
Moreover, lawyers face an incentive to signal their quality and so 
to help develop the public meaning of signals. Given the prospect of 
emerging as the winner of a tournament, individual lawyers have an 
incentive to persuade the public that their superior quality is revealed 
by, for example, their tough attitude or their win/loss record or the 
high quality of their suits. In doing so they will naturally exploit what­
ever beliefs lie dormant among the pool of prospective clients and 
whatever slim informative value a signal might have. The most suc­
cessful signals will be those that are widely believed to be informative, 
because clients will have their beliefs confirmed by others, both di­
rectly by reputation and indirectly by evidence that the lawyers dis­
playing these signals are able to command high fees. Simultaneously, 
signals will lose their value as a means of differentiating among law-
58. This is not to say that people cannot or do not choose "nonrationally," by which I 
mean on the basis of criteria which cannot be computed in the economist's sense. 
59. I am grateful to Bruce Chapman for emphasizing the need for a shared ranking. 
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yers to the extent they become too easily displayed and hence too 
widely shared among members of the bar. 
And so some lawyers will emerge as winners, garnering large re­
wards for their (marginally) better performance as reflected by signals 
that are based on difficult-to-test beliefs. As top-ranked players in the 
legal tournament, these lawyers will be sought after by clients who 
face all-or-nothing outcomes depending on the legal representation 
they are able to secure. Their fees will reflect the amount clients have 
at stake and not, as in the perfectly competitive market, the opportu­
nity cost of the service. This is the basic characteristic of market 
power: prices driven by the value that consumers place on the good 
rather than the cost incurred by producers of the good. The deep un­
certainty in law and the all-or-nothing nature of the stakes for clients 
give lawyers market power through winner-take-all dynamics. 
The driving role of clients' willingness to pay also suggests that we 
can predict that there will not be just one legal tournament, but sev­
eral. Clients form different pools based on the types of legal problems 
they have, the amounts at stake, and the amount they are able to pay. 
Lawyers who fail to win big in a high stakes pool with resource-rich 
clients will move to compete in other pools; so will clients who lose in 
one pool (the capacity limitations for individual lawyers and firms is 
an important difference between legal markets and Frank's primary 
examples of winner-take-all markets). In effect, the market plays suc­
cessive rounds, with the winners - lawyers and clients - in each 
round exiting the competition, leaving the losers to compete again. 
Tournament winners in each pool will be able to charge fees that re­
flect the willingness to pay of the clients in that pool. Thus, most law­
yers will be "winners" in the sense of exercising market power to set 
fees that extract a large share of the value of their clients' cases. 
The only legal work where we should expect a different result is 
legal work that is not characterized by deep uncertainty. Where legal 
work is routine and standardized - simple wills, uncontested divorces, 
house closings - clients need only find a lawyer who meets a thresh­
old level of competence. In these nonadversarial settings, "relative" 
performance is not relevant. Here the elements of winner-take-all dy­
namics are absent, and competition is likely to work. And, indeed, it is 
for these types of legal tasks that the market shows evidence of com­
petition: low flat fees, consumer-oriented legal plans, multiple provid­
ers. Incomes earned by lawyers in these markets are not high;60 and 
this is where, by and large, the lawyers who do not succeed in the 
more lucrative tournaments practice. 
60. See Michael G. Crawford, The 1999 Canadian Lawyer National Compensation Sur­
vey, CANADIAN LAW., June 1999, at 21, 23, 24. This article provides Canadian data on the 
salaries of lawyers in solo to four-practitioner firms and firms with five to twenty-five law­
yers. 
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D. "You Don't Switch Horses in the Middle of a Race": Sunk Costs 
and Opportunistic Behavior 
To this point we have been looking at pricing dynamics in the mar­
ket for lawyers as if all lawyers, and not just those in the market for 
routinized services, charged a flat fee. In fact legal fees are usually ei­
ther the product of an hourly rate and the amount of time spent on a 
matter, or a percentage of settlements or damage awards. In addition, 
the cost of legal representation in both cases includes disbursements 
- fees for experts, couriers, phone calls, copying, and so on. In both 
the hourly fee and the contingency fee setting, the total bill for legal 
services is incremental and develops over time. 
This introduces an important deviation from the hypothetical per­
fectly competitive market. Once a client chooses a lawyer it is costly 
to switch. Both client and lawyer invest time and resources into their 
relationship. Clients spend time explaining their situation to their 
lawyers; this time usually comes out of a fixed amount of time before a 
statute of limitations or other time bar or time advantage runs out. 
Lawyers spend time getting to know their clients, gathering facts, re­
searching law, and analyzing strategy. Lawyers also invest time devel­
oping a relationship with the lawyers on the other side of the case. 
These investments have an important effect on the economics of the 
relationship because many of them are largely sunk: they cannot be 
recouped or costlessly transferred to a new lawyer-client relationship. 
Lawyers can and do keep records that can be handed over, although 
whether they will produce their notes for a replacement lawyer is an­
other question.61 Even so, a new lawyer will have to do many things 
over: develop a relationship with the client and the other parties and 
lawyers in the case, learn about the facts, read the relevant case law, 
think through alternative strategies, and review the history of the case 
to date. 
These costs, all of which must be ultimately paid for by the client, 
are another source of market power for lawyers. Once a client has 
committed to a lawyer, the lawyer has the ability to exploit the cost of 
switching. This is a well-known phenomenon in markets known as 
opportunism.62 Lawyers can opportunistically expand the number of 
hours they devote to the case (if they are earning hourly fees) or 
minimize their investment (if they are on contingency and this case is 
not as valuable as others in their portfolio). They can engage in con-
61. According to the Law Society of Upper Canada, (the professional body which regu­
lates the legal profession in Ontario, Canada), a lawyer must surrender all records and notes 
to his or her client's replacement lawyer upon receiving written notification from the client 
of the change. Telephone Interview with Harl Viswanathan, Staff Person, Law Society of 
Upper Canada (July 19, 1999). 
62. See 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 703-10 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
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duct that produces more in the way of advertising for them than re­
sults for their clients. They can do low quality or low value work. 
They can squander resources on experts, studies, paralegals, associ­
ates, couriers, and support services. They can do these things because 
there is little risk, on a given matter, that they will be fired. Here the 
problem is not the difficulty clients face in recognizing when their law­
yer is doing poor or unnecessary work; it is that the client is locked in. 
The risk of opportunism is present in many markets, and many 
markets have mechanisms to control opportunism. In markets in 
which price and quality can be effectively contracted for up front, op­
portunism can be prevented. In markets where only quality can be 
fixed up front, competing providers can devise pricing schemes that 
allow them to compensate the buyer up-front for the money that will 
be extracted in the future. In markets in which quality is not fixed but 
can be measured, compensation schemes can be tied to quality so as to 
overcome the incentive to shirk. And in many markets, reputation -
with the threat of lost future business - serves as an effective check 
on opportunism. 
Legal markets, however, offer few mechanisms for controlling op­
portunism. Again the problem is complexity and the difficulty of 
judging the quality and necessity of legal work. In the great majority 
of cases, it is far too costly, if not impossible, to write contracts that 
control the lawyer's behavior. The essence of the transaction between 
lawyer and client is the expert judgment that the lawyer offers in 
steering a client through the legal process; most of these judgments are 
of value only to the extent they are responsive to circumstances as 
they evolve. Reputation, with the market or with a particular repeat 
client, offers some constraint, but again judging whether in a given 
case efforts were misdirected or excessive or insufficient is difficult; it 
is therefore hard for reputations to develop that are truly informative. 
As we have already discussed, reputations can only be based on indi­
cia of performance that are of limited value as hard data. Ex post re­
view of the work of a lawyer is limited. 
It is possible, of course, to tie compensation to outcomes with a 
contingency fee. This creates an incentive for lawyers to devote effec­
tive time and effort to a case. The incentive is far from perfect and is 
of limited applicability, however. For starters, the lawyer receives 
only a fraction (usually around 30%) of the value of the case and so 
faces a private return for effort that is less than the joint return: the 
contingency lawyer will give up on a case before the point at which le­
gal effort is not worth the expected payoff for the client. Second, the 
client incurs the cost of disbursements in the event of a win, and (usu­
ally) the lawyer does so in the event of a loss. If the value of the case 
is sufficiently high, this means that the lawyer will have an incentive to 
invest too much in these costs. Third, contingency lawyers have to 
hold a portfolio of cases so as to hedge the risks they are taking on. At 
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any given time, then, they are allocating their time based on which 
cases will produce greater value on the margin. This means that con­
tingency clients are vulnerable to having their cases sidelined when a 
bigger fish comes along. Even if it were in some sense efficient for the 
lawyer to allocate time to the bigger case,63 the sidelined client is not 
compensated. This both distorts the lawyer's time allocation decision 
and leads to a loss of the client's sunk investment. 
Finally, contingency fee arrangements are difficult to structure be­
cause of the substantial uncertainty about the relationship between le­
gal effort and outcome, and the unpredictability of law. The fee paid 
only in the event of a win has to be higher than the fee that would 
have been paid on a noncontingent basis: if a lawyer can earn $100 an 
hour on a noncontingent basis and she has a 50% chance of winning, 
she needs to charge at least $200 an hour to her contingency client in 
order for it to make sense to work on contingency; if she's risk averse, 
she needs to charge even more to compensate for her risk bearing. To 
determine the appropriate fee in a given case, then, the lawyer has to 
have what she considers to be a reasonable estimate of the probability 
of winning. But this is, as we have emphasized throughout, very diffi­
cult to do. It is especially difficult to do at the initiation of the lawyer­
client relationship, before the lawyer has had much opportunity to in­
vestigate the law, the facts, and her client's reliability. But it is pre­
cisely the sunk investment in such investigations that puts the client at 
risk of opportunism in the setting of a fee. Contingency fees tailored 
to the risks of a particular case are therefore going to be very difficult 
to calculate64 and are not likely to effectively eliminate opportunism. 
The fact that contingency fees appear to dominate the market in 
only a subset of cases, and the fact that they are generally set as a 
fairly uniform 25 to 33% of money damages, supports these conclu­
sions. Contingency fees are used, primarily, by solo practitioner plain­
tiffs' personal injury lawyers. This suggests several things. First, the 
clients in this segment of the market are individuals who, for the most 
part, lack substantial wealth with which to pay legal fees. Without a 
contingency fee, these clients are likely not to enter the legal market. 
Second, as plaintiffs, a "win" for them is a gain rather than the avoid­
ance of a loss; the fee therefore can be taken out of the winnings and 
63. There are many difficult issues embedded here. For one, efficiency is not necessarily 
the right criterion for allocating access to justice; other values are at stake. Moreover, it is 
difficult to apply tl:ie concept of efficiency here because court-awarded damages (or settle­
ments reached in the shadow of such damages) reflect public, not private, valuations of 
harm. The victim of racial discrimination on the job may be harmed to a greater extent or 
judged to be more deserving of access to the courts than the victim of a slip-and-fall, but the 
latter may be a more lucrative client for the contingency lawyer. 
64. The appropriate contingency fee will be even more difficult when the fee is a per­
centage of money damages. In these cases, the lawyer will also have to have a reasonable 
estimate of the amount of money damages, something which shows high variance, especially 
in jury trials. 
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not out of whatever wealth they have. We know that people are risk 
loving when it comes to potential wins (people like to buy lottery tick­
ets even when they have negative expected value) but risk averse 
when it comes to potential losses (the same people buy house and car 
insurance). The fact that defendants with the wealth to pay in the 
event of a "win" (avoidance of a loss) generally do not pay on contin­
gency suggests that the additional risk is not worth it. 
Most importantly, however, the cases taken on by these lawyers 
are high volume and bear substantial similarities. Some accident cases 
are largely routine: there are fairly standard methods of valuing the 
injuries (broken arms, whiplash, lacerations), fairly standard alloca­
tions of liability (running a red light, intoxication, icy walkways). For 
the same reason, there is usually insurance for the injury, and legal 
representation largely amounts to processing a settlement claim with 
an insurer. Even when the injuries or liability are not routine, the high 
volume of cases still permits lawyers to get the valuation of cases right 
on average, even if not in a given instance. The standardization of the 
contingency percentage throughout this segment of the market may 
well reflect the fact that all a lawyer in this market knows is that by 
charging that percentage, and signing a portfolio of cases, other law­
yers are able to earn a living. 
Exploring the economics of contingency fees is a topic in itself,65 
but we can at least say this much: Contingency fees appear in the 
market in only specialized circumstances. They may create more costs 
than they save. They may be too difficult to calculate outside of the 
personal injury setting. They may be less lucrative than hourly fees for 
lawyers who have succeeded in the tournaments in more prestigious 
segments of the market (plaintiff personal injury law is ranked as very 
low prestige by most lawyers).66 Whatever the case, the fact will re­
main that most legal fees are charged on an hourly sunk-cost basis and 
hence expose the client to the risk of opportunism. 
E. Fool's Game: The Sunk Cost Auction 
There is a further important economic effect arising from the sunk 
and incremental nature of hourly fees. It works like this: 
Suppose I offer to auction off a $20 bill under the following rule: 
the person who bids the most will get the $20 for the price he bids -
this is the standard way in which an auction works. The auction I am 
running, however, has a special rule: the person who bids the second­
highest amount must also pay out the amount she bids even though 
she loses the $20 to the highest bidder. This auction, sometimes 
65. For a recent addition to this large literature, see Kritzer, supra note 38. 
66. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 27. 
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known as a sunk-cost auction, has in fact been run in many business 
school classrooms. The usual result? The winning bid exceeds $20.67 
The bidding in such auctions is rational. Suppose you have bid $18 
and the only other person in the auction bids $18.50. If you drop out 
of the auction at that point you lose $18 as the second-place bid. If 
you bid $19 instead, you stand a chance of being the winner, in which 
case you will pay $19 for the $20 and be ahead by $1. Your opponent, 
however, now faces the choice of losing $18.50 or bidding, say, $19.50 
and being ahead by 50 cents. There is nothing special about breaking 
the $20 mark in this process: if your opponent has bid $25 and you 
have bid $24, you'll lose $24 if you stop; you can reduce your loss to $6 
if you bid $26. Whatever the second-highest bidder has bid at any 
point in time is sunk - it must be paid regardless of who wins. The 
decision to bid again or not depends only on whether the next incre­
ment will be bested or not. 
There is no rational place for this to end; as a matter of practice it 
ends only when someone gives up, no longer caring that he can reduce 
his losses by roughly $20 if he keeps going, or when someone runs out 
of money. It may seem that it would be irrational even to get into this 
auction in the first place. But if everyone refuses to play, it pays to be 
the only one who's game. 
Legal expenses billed by the hour (or any other incremental 
amount, such as in task-based billing) generally have the same type of 
structure as the sunk cost auction. This is particularly true for litiga­
tion. Once a legal action is started, it costs money to keep going. In 
most cases, if you stop participating in the action, you suffer a default 
judgment against you, losing the entire amount at stake. As with the 
$20 auction, at any given point in the litigation, it doesn't matter how 
much you've already spent on legal fees if the next increment - the 
cost of going to trial one more day, for example, or responding to one 
more motion - maintains your chance of winning. And as with the 
$20 auction, the amount at stake is no limit to what you may end up 
spending to keep in the game. 
It therefore becomes rational for legal fees to exceed the amount 
of money at stake. If the other side is willing to talk settlement, there 
is an opportunity to quit the game and rationally weigh the cost of 
continuing (or even starting) against potential settlements. (This is 
what could happen in the $20 auction if players could collude and 
reach a side-deal.) As we have already seen in different contexts, the 
uncertainty about legal outcomes and the value of legal inputs makes 
such assessments difficult in the first place. But when the other side is 
not talking but litigating, and filing deadlines are approaching, there is 
67. In one reported case, a negotiation professor managed to auction a $100 bill for 
$7,000. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: How LAWYERS HELP 
CLIENTS CREATE v ALUE IN NEGOTIATION (forthcoming 2000). 
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no way to avoid the sunk cost rationality of spending more even after 
you have exceeded the amount you stand to gain or lose in a judg­
ment. 
It gets worse. Half of the players in the litigation game have no 
choice about getting into the game in the first place: defendants. The 
legal system, unlike the $20 auction, is coercive. Shifting fees to the 
losing party only makes things worse: now the cost of quitting and 
going into default is even higher. The worse the plaintiff's case, the 
greater the plaintiff's incentive to continue at any given point. And 
the increments in which "bids" must be made is set by the auctioneers 
who collect at the end: lawyers. 
With these dynamics, settlement might be better thought of as oc­
curring in the shadow of the sunk cost auction, not the law. Every 
hour a lawyer works has, in a sense, the same value as the first hour: 
the entire amount at stake. This puts lawyers in a powerful position to 
extract amounts governed not by the "value" of their services but 
rather by the wealth of clients. Even without deliberate padding of 
the bill, lawyers receive an economic windfall: the rewards of a proc­
ess the cost of which is unmoored from the economic value of what it 
produces. 
F. Monopoly 
As the discussion to this point has demonstrated, the market suf­
fers from many deviations from perfect competition, without the need 
to point to monopoly restrictions. It is now important to examine 
more closely what role monopoly might play and in what form, and 
how supply restrictions might interact with the market imperfections 
already enumerated. 
Monopoly in the market for lawyers - or, more generically, the 
ability to extract pure economic rents - comes from three different 
sources. The commonly recognized source of monopoly power is arti­
ficial barriers to entry to the practice of law: state prohibition of the 
practice of law by nonlawyers and limitations on the number of people 
admitted to law schools and the bar. I examine the extent to which 
these artificial barriers give lawyers market power first. I then tum to 
a more detailed examination of two less recognized but probably more 
important sources of the power to extract rents. The first is a set of 
natural entry barriers to the practice of law - the increasing returns 
to human capital and scale, the limited opportunities to gain experi­
ence in procedures and with decisionmakers, and natural limitations 
on the supply of individuals with the cognitive ability necessary to ef­
fectively engage in the complex reasoning of law and legal process. 
The second is the state's monopoly on coercive dispute resolution -
only dispute resolution through the public courts can force the other 
party to the table. 
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1. Artificial Barriers to Entry 
The emergence of the legal profession is tied to the emergence of 
state-enforced restrictio:ns on who may perform certain roles in rela­
tion to the legal process: who may advocate for another in court, who 
may convey land, who may prepare or witness legal documents, and so 
on. These restrictions, appearing in England in the thirteenth century, 
were the result of, it appears, both genuine concerns about the quality 
of work being done by those holding themselves out as legal practitio­
ners and self-interested motives on the part of those with legal train-
ing.68 -
Licensing restrictions can create an artificial barrier to entry in two 
ways: costs and quotas. Obtaining a license requires training of some 
kind: a demonstration of specialized knowledge is the justification for 
licensing in the first place. Training is costly to obtain, whether in 
terms of tuition fees or foregone income during a period of appren­
ticeship or legal education. As in any market with an entry cost, this 
raises the equilibrium price above marginal costs. In and of itself, this 
is not a particularly troubling market imperfection. If the costs of 
training are the necessary costs of performing the service, those who 
provide the service are just compensated for that cost. More impor­
tantly, the number of providers is still high, and if this barrier were the 
only imperfection, pricing decisions would still be made by suppliers 
who behaved as if they had no influence over the market price. 
Spurious training requirements and restrictions on access to the 
necessary training are potentially more important entry barriers. Both 
of these are artificial limitations that may result from the abuse of con­
trol over entry to the profession. Again the complexity of law is the 
key factor. The difficulty facing nonlawyers in judging legal compe­
tence has, historically, led to self-regulation of the profession: the pro­
fession establishes its own entry requirements. The moral hazard in 
such control is evident and has been well appreciated throughout the 
history of the profession.69 In England and Canada, the law societies 
establish training requirements, including required law school courses 
and hours, articling (apprenticeship) periods, and required bar­
conducted courses prior to bar examinations. In the United States, the 
bar sets requirements for accreditation of law schools, and most juris­
dictions require completion of an accredited law degree before admis­
sion to the bar.70 In all these jurisdictions, the bar examination is set 
and graded by the bar. At all these points, the profession faces the 
68. See Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regu­
lation, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 {1998). 
69. See id. 
70. In California, admission to the bar may be obtained solely by passing the bar exami­
nation. Historically, extremely few people have managed to pass without a law degree. 
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temptation to limit its numbers in order to limit competition: limiting 
the number of accredited schools or establishing requirements that are 
limited for other reasons (such as the willingness of law firms to take 
on articling students for economic reasons), and increasing the diffi­
culty and hence reducing the pass rate of the bar exams. Historically, 
such limitations have been evident. Theoretically, they can raise the 
price of legal services above competitive levels. 
Although these artificial barriers to entry are the commonly rec­
ognized sources of monopoly power in the market for lawyers, empiri­
cally there has to be some doubt that they are an important source. 
Compared to England and Canada, the United States has fewer entry 
restrictions to the practice of law and a much larger number of lawyers 
per capita, and yet American attorneys charge higher fees and earn 
higher incomes than their counterparts in the Commonwealth. The 
past several decades in the United States have seen the elimination of 
artificial barriers to entry and a tremendous increase in the number of 
lawyers entering the profession; these same decades have simultane­
ously seen legal fees and incomes skyrocket in large and elite firms 
while falling for solo practitioners.71 The evidence of growing unem­
ployment and underemployment among lawyers,72 co-existing with 
fees that are beyond the reach of most individuals for other than rou­
tine legal services such as house closings and uncontested divorces or 
the pursuit on contingency of large monetary awards in personal in­
jury cases, suggests that despite the obvious economics of artificial en­
try barriers, these are not at the root of the high cost of legal services. 
2. Natural Barriers to Entry 
I believe that the more important barriers to entry in the legal pro­
fession are naturally occurring limitations on supply related to the 
complexity of legal reasoning and process. For other than routine, 
generally noncontested legal matters - house closings, simple busi­
ness incorporations, administrative procedures, simple wills, and stan­
dard contracts - effective legal representation requires substantial 
human capital. Human capital in law is dependent on access to three 
factors: legal education, practical experience, and the cognitive ability 
to process and engage in complex reasoning. I have already consid­
ered the importance of artificial barriers to access to legal education 
and training. In this Section I turn to the natural restrictions on access 
to practical experience and the supply of individuals with the cognitive 
ability to engage in legal reasoning. 
71. See Sander & Williams, supra note 6, at 449-51. 
72. See Monique Conrod, Unemployment and Under-employment: The Harsh Reality 
Facing New Lawyers, LAW. WKLY., Sept. 16, 1994, at 5. 
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a. Experience and the Accumulation of Human Capital. A little 
knowledge is a dangerous thing. A law degree, by itself, leaves a law­
yer poorly equipped to do very much in the real world of client repre­
sentation. Only experience in the actual practice of law allows a law­
yer to convert the knowledge and reasoning skills gained at law school 
into valuable legal services. The subtlety and variability of legal rea­
soning and procedure, the sensitivity of legal outcomes to a great mul­
titude of influences, the role of subjectivity, values, time pressures, and 
serendipity - all these factors and more make practical experience 
tremendously important in the acquisition of legal skill. 
Much experiential knowledge is available to essentially any lawyer 
who ventures into practice. Practicing lawyers cannot help but learn 
about client relations, the form of pleadings, standard contract lan­
guage, filing deadlines and procedures, and so on. The most valuable 
experiential knowledge is, however, available to only some, not all, 
lawyers. This is because there are limited supplies of opportunities to 
gain certain experiences. As a result, even if entry into the profession 
generally is unrestricted, the supply of providers of specific types of 
legal services is limited by a barrier to entry to that segment of the 
profession. 
Consider the experience necessary to conduct litigation. Every 
lawyer who does any litigation work will learn about the procedures 
and standard approaches to filing the early documents in a trial and 
conducting the initial phases of litigation. But few cases - between 5 
and 10% of filed cases - ever get to trial.73 This means that in prac­
tice either all litigators rarely conduct a full trial or that only a small 
number of litigators conduct trials with any frequency. 
The small number of trials (relative to filed cases) is in part a result 
of the incentives to settle to save litigation costs and the ability of pre­
trial procedures to effectively resolve disputes without trial. But it is 
also the result of external constraints: the number and capacity of 
courts to hear trials. These external constraints are a practical limit on 
the number of trials that can be conducted and hence on the number 
of lawyers who can gain the practical experience of conducting a trial. 
The importance of this limitation on access to trial experience 
grows in importance as a natural74 barrier to entry to the litigation 
segment of the legal profession when we take account of the market 
dynamics that are likely to operate. Lawyers with trial experience will 
be more highly valued than lawyers without trial experience. They 
will be more highly valued by those clients who are committed to tak-
73. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 
JUDICATURE 161, 162 (1986); Carl Baar, The Myth of Settlement (1998) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
74. I use the term "natural" here only to distinguish these barriers from the "artificial" 
barriers that are put in place with the objective of restricting entry into the profession. 
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ing their matters to trial; they will also be more highly valued by those 
clients who hope to settle but who recognize that their bargaining po­
sition will be enhanced by a credible threat of a well-conducted trial. 
Lawyers who have trial experience will be particularly sought out by 
those with nonroutine cases that are more likely to result in a trial. As 
a consequence, experience will breed further experience, and the lim­
ited supply of opportunities to gain experience will be even further re­
stricted. And as we have recognized in connection with the winner­
take-all nature of legal practice, the response of the market will be 
largely driven by relative, not absolute, differences in experience. Un­
able to judge the difference between lawyers with more or less experi­
ence as a quantum, clients are likely to base valuations on rankings: 
not how much experience, but whether more or less experience. In 
this way even random events affecting initial exposure to trial on the 
margin will be reinforced and made self-fulfilling and significant. 
The point goes deeper. A lawyer with no trial experience is less 
valuable than one with trial experience; and a lawyer with general trial 
experience is less valuable than a lawyer with trial experience specific 
to the c�se at hand. The complexity and unpredictability of law, as we 
have explored previously, stems significantly from its sensitivity to 
multiple influences. Many of these influences are specific to the par­
ticular issues and the location of a case. Localized knowledge is im­
portant. Conducting trials to the bench is different from conducting 
trials before juries; experience with the former will teach one thing, 
with the latter something else. Large trials with vast quantities of 
documents or complex issues teach skills that smaller, simpler cases do 
not. Experience with experts, particular kinds of experts, and indeed 
with particular experts will also differentiate lawyers. Experience­
based knowledge about the inclinations of courts in a particular re­
gion, of a particular court, or of a particular judge will be progressively 
more valuable. Local lawyers who know the local rules, practices, and 
personalities Gudges, court personnel, other lawyers) have an advan­
tage over those drawn from a wider area. The more unpredictable law 
is, the more being an "expert" will be limited to a narrow domain. 
These effects are not limited to litigation. Opportunities to gain 
experience with particular agencies can be limited in administrative 
law. Opportunities to gain experience with transactions of a particular 
type or size or complexity will be limited in corporate law. These limi­
tations can be dramatic. As one former Bar Association president ob­
served, at least at one point in time, "[c]orporate acquisition and take­
over strategies are the preserve of two New York City firms."75 
We can begin to see that the complexity of law will result in the 
breakdown of the profession into increasingly specialized segments, 
75. JOSEPH W. BARTLETI, THE LAW BUSINESS: A TIRED MONOPOLY 7 (1982). 
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each cordoned off by natural barriers to entry. There are only so 
many opportunities to do jury trials in this jurisdiction, with these 
types of issues. There are only so many opportunities to manage and 
litigate big cases, only so many opportunities to defend certain types 
of environmental or criminal or antitrust matters. There are only so 
many transactions of this size, in this industry, with these foreign coun­
tries. Those who happen to get such opportunities then possess a sig­
nificant advantage over others in securing further such cases. Compe­
tition within these specialized segments is consequently muted. 
The role of experiential human capital in the structure and hence 
competitiveness of the market for lawyers can be understood in terms 
of two related economic concepts: increasing returns to specialization 
and increasing returns to scale. 
Increasing returns to specialization in law occur for the same rea­
son they occur in any market with significant human capital input. 
Generally speaking, those with experience - some initial human capi­
tal - learn more from subsequent experiences than those without ex­
perience. Moreover, as between two individuals with different de­
grees of experience in a given type of work - giving one a 
comparative advantage over the other - specialization by the more 
experienced one in that work will be more efficient, producing greater 
value in the market overall, than will splitting the work between the 
two.76 To the extent the market for lawyers works toward efficient re­
source allocation, it will take possibly small initial differences between 
lawyers and magnify them through specialization. The mechanism for 
this is the recognition by clients of the comparative advantage offered 
by the lawyer with greater experience in a particular type of legal 
work and hence their greater willingness to retain, and pay, that law­
yer. 
Increasing returns to specialization in law also occur because of 
imperfections specific to the market for lawyers that we have already 
discussed. These are the difficulty of judging quality in absolute terms 
and the resulting reliance on relative rankings and signals with only a 
loose relationship to quality. These imperfections produce the 
experience-breeds-experience effect in the market, as those with expe­
rience are then more likely to be hired by clients who bring with them 
further opportunities for learning. Specialization exhibits increasing 
returns, then, because the more experience one has, the greater the 
expected number of future opportunities to make use of the experi­
ence, and hence the greater the marginal value of obtaining further 
experience. This effect will be present up until the point, if it exists, at 
which the expected number of future opportunities to use experience 
falls below the capacity of the lawyer or law firm. 
76. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ONTHEFAMILY 33 {1982). 
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Markets in which information or knowledge play an important role 
also tend to be characterized by increasing returns to scale. Informa­
tion is a nonrivalrous input. This means that the use of information in 
the provision of services to one user does not diminish the capacity to 
use the information in the provision of services to another user.77 
- Even though information is costly to obtain in the first instance, the 
marginal cost of using the information for additional users is zero. As 
a result the marginal value of additional users is increasing as the 
number increases, and the fixed costs of obtaining the information are 
spread across a larger number of users. This produces increasing re­
turns to scale, and again the market will tend to gravitate to small 
numbers of providers with large scale. The number of providers -
whether one, a few, or many - will depend on the capacity limits fac­
ing providers and the level of demand.78 
In the case of legal services, the scale of providers within a given 
segment of the market depends on the ability to share experiential 
human capital.79 In one sense this is limited by the very nature of ex­
periential human capital: it is best or only learned through experience. 
Still, there are some ways to share some types of human capital gained 
through experience. Some information can in fact be conveyed by 
presentations and conversations, observation, and critique among law­
yers. Experience can also be shared by delegating tasks or whole cases 
to inexperienced lawyers whose work is directed or overseen by expe­
rienced ones. Access to limited opportunities to gain experience can 
also be increased by expanding the number of lawyers who participate 
in a given opportunity to gain experience: sitting in on meetings and 
strategy sessions, preparing documents, attending trials and negotia­
tions, performing due diligence searches and legal research, and so on. 
The distinctive size differences between the personal and business 
sectors of the legal profession suggest that there are substantial differ­
ences between the possibilities for sharing experience and human capi­
tal among lawyers in these sectors. The growth of the large law firm, 
which is almost always dedicated to corporate clients, stands in stark 
contrast to the continuing reliance on solo or small firm practice by 
77. This is not to say that there are not competitive or other advantages to having pri­
vate access to information, or that the information is less valuable the more others have it. 
Nonrivalry in consumption refers only to the fact that the quantity or quality of information 
in not diminished by consumption, as is the case for most goods. 
78. For other analyses of the role of human capital and intangible assets such as reputa­
tion in the organization of law firms, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Displlling 
Through Assets: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. 
REv. 509 {1994); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 55; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, 
Sharing Among The Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm 
and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 {1985). 
79. Sharing human capital is central to the analysis of GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 
55. 
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those representing individuals. In the personal sphere, only in the 
provision of standardized services such as simple wills or uncontested 
divorces has there been some move to large organizations. Here scale 
has been achieved in the form of chains of small offices which share 
the benefits of experience concretely in standardized documents and 
procedures.80 Transactional work is probably inherently subject to 
greater sharing possibilities than litigation work: much of the work 
product in transactions is done over time (and hence capable of review 
if delegated to subordinates) and memorialized in documents. Litiga­
tion experience tends to play out significantly in performance on the 
spot and trial techniques. Overall, there are varying limitations on the 
extent to which scale economies in the production of some legal serv­
ices can be achieved. 
b. Cognitive Aptitude. The acquisition of human capital through 
formal education or practical experience depends not only on the op­
portunity to learn but also on the underlying capacity of a particular 
individual to absorb and engage in a given form of reasoning. People 
differ in their aptitude for (not to mention interest in) logical puzzles 
and strategic analysis, their ability to perceive relationships among fac­
tors, and their capacity for drawing linguistic and normative distinc­
tions. The complexity of legal reasoning establishes a minimum level 
of aptitude for specific tasks that lawyers must possess if they are to be 
effective. This is a minimum that in many cases implies a significant 
"natural" limit on the supply of potential providers of legal services. 
Again, by "natural" I do not mean to imply that the supply is not de­
termined by all kinds of factors that are subject to social control, influ­
ence, and change; I only mean to distinguish this barrier to entry from 
"artificial" barriers erected for the purpose of restricting supply below 
competitive levels. 
The importance the profession attaches to aptitude for specific 
types of reasoning tasks is underscored by the reliance on the Law 
School Admission Test ("LSAT") for evaluating potential applicants 
to law school. Essentially all law schools in North America require 
applicants to take the test, and most rely heavily, if not exclusively, on 
the LSAT score in combination with undergraduate grades in selecting 
students. The scored portions of the LSAT test three skills: reading 
comprehension, logical reasoning (tested by asking questions about 
the implications or validity of short arguments), and analytical rea­
soning (tested by asking questions about the solution to logical games 
80. See Carroll Seron, Managing Entrepreneurial Legal Services: The Transformation of 
Small-Firm Practice, in LAWYERS' !DEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 63 (Nelson et al. eds., 
1992). Standardization, however, appears to have effectively put these lawyers out of busi­
ness. See Karen Dillon, After the Revolution, AM. LAW., Apr. 1996, at 64-66. The pioneers 
- Jacoby & Meyers and Hyatt Legal Services - have largely folded. Hyatt now focuses on 
offering pre-paid plans - which pay the plan attorney of the client's choice a set fee for pro­
viding standardized services - as employee benefits to large corporations. See id. at 66-67. 
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and puzzles). Test-takers also complete a writing sample, which is 
forwarded to law schools but not scored. 
Judging by LSAT score alone, practicing lawyers are an elite 
group. Fewer than 10% of the over 175 law schools in the United 
States have median LSAT scores below the 50th percentile. Schools 
in the top 25%81 have median LSAT scores above the 85th percentile. 
The top 15 schools have medians above the 94th percentile. These sta­
tistics establish that entry into law school is largely restricted to those 
with above-average aptitude for logical and analytical reasoning. 
Moreover, they are above average for the pool of individuals who 
have determined that they are potential candidates for law school, a 
self-selection that undoubtedly rules out a great majority of the popu­
lation. In addition, whereas students attending top schools have bar 
pass rates over 90% - above the average for the jurisdiction - stu­
dents attending lower-ranked schools have pass rates that are roughly 
average for the jurisdiction, generally between 70 and 80%. This 
means that the distribution of LSAT scores of those actually entering 
the profession (as opposed to law school) is more skewed to the well­
above-average than the data for law school admission reveals. 
When we take into account the legal work done by different mem­
bers of the profession, these numbers take on added significance. 
Studies of the profession suggest that there are distinct differences 
among lawyers.82 Elite lawyers graduate from elite law schools and 
tend to practice complex law in large firms, largely doing work for 
corporations. The "storefront lawyer" who is providing routine legal 
work for individuals is, generally, a graduate of a lower tier school. 
Whereas there appears to have been, over the past several years, a 
glut of lawyers in the lower tiers, there has been a shortage of lawyers 
in the upper tier.83 This suggests that the ability to provide non­
routine legal services is limited to those with the aptitude reflected in 
the admissions statistics for the top schools, such as above the 85th 
percentile. 
Admittedly, these statistics do not tell us definitively about the ne­
cessity of a given level of aptitude for legal reasoning, nor the rarity of 
that level of aptitude. They could be the result merely of the limita­
tion on the number of places in leading law schools and competition 
for those slots. But the experience of teaching law students, especially 
at the leading law schools, supports the inference that the statistics do 
reflect an important barrier to entry. The LSAT is used to classify 
candidates for law school because it is a decent predictor of law school 
81. AJ; ranked by U.S. News and World Report in 1999. See Exclusive Rankings: Schools 
of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 29, 1999, at 94. 
82 See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 27. 
83. See Sander & Williams, supra note 6. 
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grades, better than undergraduate grades on their own.84 This implies 
that the skills tested by the LSAT are more specific than general aca­
demic ability and that those who do well in law school will tend, on 
average, to be better at these skills. This links up with teaching expe­
rience in the following way. 
Most law professors would agree that students, even students at 
elite schools, differ substantially in their ability to engage in legal rea­
soning. And in fact, snobbish or not, most law professors at elite 
schools think that students who do not "get" the exam question are 
not very smart, even though they are in fact drawn from the upper 
echelons of LSAT test-takers. Law professors have little difficulty, 
with experience, setting an exam question which will produce a natural 
bell curve (and in fact most law schools require grading on the bell 
curve): most students will get the basics but miss the deeper, more 
complex, issues, a handful will "see" the problem in its deeper dimen­
sions of subtlety, and some will miss crucial points or indeed the point 
entirely. All of these gradations will of course be relative - to the 
pool of students and indeed to the professor's own legal reasoning 
skills. 
· 
What teaching teaches is that some students are able to analyze a 
legal problem better than others, and that those who stand out are few 
in number. For problems that are sufficiently complex - or, rather, 
for which there are sufficient client resources available to explore suf­
ficient complexities - these stand-outs are not just marginally better 
than the rest, they are categorically better. Increasing admission to 
elite law schools, which implies a lower LSAT median for the entering 
class, probably will not significantly change the number of students 
who stand out in their capacity for legal analysis. Because legal rea­
soning is as complex as one participant wants to make it,85 this small 
group of people with a high aptitude for analytical reasoning, logical 
puzzles, and reading comprehension define a (very high) threshold of 
effectively necessary competence in the high-end large firm or bou­
tique legal market. The limited supply of people in the population 
with such aptitude (and interest in and access to a legal career) is 
borne out by the perceived shortage of lawyers in this market, despite 
the glut of lawyers in the solo and general practice small firm segments 
of the market. Competitive cognitive processing progressively raises 
the level of cognitive skill necessary to play the game.86 
84. See Linda F. Wightman, Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of 
the 1990-1992 Correlation Studies, in LSAC REsEARCH REPORT SERIES 23 (1993). 
85. Actually there is a limit imposed by the ability of the judge to understand the level 
of complexity; it is possible to overshoot the court and lose as a result 
86. This point is similar to, but not the same as, the winner-take-all point. The focus 
here is on increases in the absolute level of skill that a tournament which rewards on the ba­
sis of relative skill establishes as a threshold for being a potential competitor. The difference 
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The significance of this "naturally" limited supply of potential 
high-end lawyers is then the easy free-market economics of a scarce 
resource: the resources go to the highest bidders. The perceived 
shortage of such lawyers suggests that this is not just a market charac­
terized by inelastic supply, but indeed a market in which demand ex­
ceeds supply, all sources of supply have been exhausted, and the re­
source is consequently priced as high as it can be - extracting the 
entire (expected) surplus (or more) derived from its use. The alloca­
tion of high-end legal skill is then driven by the wealth of potential cli­
ents, not the opportunity cost of supply. This is the characteristic of a 
monopolized, not competitive, market. The key point is that the 
source of the monopoly is the "natural" barrier of the scarce availabil­
ity of the cognitive skills necessary to engage in complex legal reason­
ing. 
3. State Monopoly on Coercive Dispute Resolution 
The ability to extract monopoly rents for the use of human capital 
assets that are in limited supply, or to exploit the market imperfections 
arising from the credence quality of legal services or the sunk nature 
of investments in lawyers and legal process, is ultimately dependent on 
the existence of a more fundamental monopoly. That is the monopoly 
the state possesses over coercive dispute resolution. Only the state 
can force an individual or an entity to respond to the conflict per­
ceived by another individual or entity; only the state can enforce a 
resolution of that conflict. Private agreements and statutory proce­
dures for dispute resolution have force - can coerce a response and 
enforce a resolution - because the state has coercive power over the 
parties to the agreement and the subjects of the statute. It is this un­
derlying monopoly that establishes the value of access to the legal sys­
tem and hence the surplus at risk of extraction by lawyers. 
The legal profession is granted this monopoly on coercive dispute 
resolution on a society-wide basis by jurisdiction. It is empowered to 
design and operate the only institution for coercive dispute resolution. 
As a collective body, the profession can and does act as a monopolist, 
offering a mechanism for dispute resolution that has no competition. 
The complexity of the reasoning and process that this collective body 
produces - as a result of its established means of resolving disputes 
about reasoning and process - means that outsiders to the profession 
cannot easily assess their rights and obligations or the prospects for 
how their disputes will be resolved by the profession. Nor can they, as 
a result of the coerciveness of the mechanism, avoid having their dis-
between the gold and the silver medalists in a given year may be miniscule, but over time the 
skill necessary to have a shot at winning increases substantially. 
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putes, at some point, subject to the reasoning and process controlled 
by the profession. 
The cost of monopoly here is not so much the moral hazard or ex­
ploitation of market power for private gain by the profession, as it is 
the inertia and unresponsiveness of an insulated service provider.87 
The legal system qua system is largely immune to pressures to reduce 
costs: those with disputes have no coercive alternative to the costly 
system if they are plaintiffs and no choice, period, if they are defen­
dants. The autonomy of law is, in very important respects, that of an 
institution that can establish its own values - the importance of due 
process or refined distinctions between cases for example - without 
pressure to take into account an important value for participants in the 
system: the cost of participating. This is not a criticism of the ethics of 
the profession. It is a fact about the nature of institutions that are 
driven largely by internal logic rather than by the need to respond to 
outside pressures and demands. 
The study of innovation emphasizes this point. Innovation tends 
to be local, in the sense of responding to the problems generated by an 
existing technology or process. This gives rise to path dependence in 
the development of new technologies and processes: what comes to 
be grows out of what is.88 The greater the diversity among potential 
sites of innovation, the greater the potential for creative leaps from 
what has been to what is possible. 
In light of its monopoly over coercive dispute resolution, the uni­
fied and importantly homogeneous nature of the legal profession takes 
on tremendous importance. The profession defines and reproduces 
itself. It establishes entry requirements that homogenize the reason­
ing processes and to some extent the values of its members - judges, 
lawyers, even many legislators. Despite the diversity of political views 
and theoretical perspectives among law professors, every law student 
learns to read cases and see in them whatever other lawyers will see in 
them: the holding, the reasoning, the procedure, the relation to the 
body of doctrine, the ambiguities that provide openings for argument 
and persuasion. As every first year law student learns, the hard way, 
learning the law is not simply the process of memorizing a set of rules. 
More importantly it is the process of learning to recognize and partici­
pate in a discourse, and to foresee how others initiated into the dis­
course will see and argue a case. It is the process of learning the un-
87. See George Symeonidis, Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian 
Hypotheses and Some New Themes, 27 OECD ECON. STUD. 35 (1996). This work presents a 
survey of empirical literature rejecting Schumpeter's hypothesis that market power and large 
firms stimulate innovation. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY (1950). 
88. See w. BRIAN ARTiiUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE 
ECONOMY (1994); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
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written but shared norms of argument, persuasion, and judgment: 
being an outlier in argument or perception is rewarded only to a point 
- too much nonconformity in reasoning fails to connect with the 
other members of the profession and so fails to accomplish its goals. 
The nature of the training is, precisely, the induction into a particular 
form and process of reasoning. 
It is this overarching uniformity in legal reasoning - what makes 
an argument recognizably "legal" - that lends force to the claim that 
the profession's monopoly over coercive dispute resolution mecha­
nisms has costs. Innovations in dispute resolution - be they ad­
dressed to considerations of justice or cost - are muted and limited to 
what will occur to a group of people who share, by virtue of their pro­
fessional training and tutored identity, a largely common set of ideas, 
perceptions, and norms about dispute resolution. More dramatic re­
sponses to the perceptions, needs, and constraints - including finan­
cial - of those who require dispute resolution services are unlikely to 
come from within the profession. 
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms can be offered by non­
lawyers, but they suffer from two important, related impediments: the 
lack of free-standing coercive power and the resulting dependence on 
the legal mechanism for binding resolution of disputes (including dis­
putes about the process of dispute resolution). Marriage counselors 
can, for example, help divorcing couples resolve their disputes, but 
they will have to refer their clients to lawyers for advice about the ef­
fective content and enforceability of their process and its resolution. 
Industry experts can help companies negotiate transactions, but they 
too will have to refer their clients to lawyers for advice about the ef­
fective content and enforceability of their contracts. It becomes natu­
ral, then, for lawyers' monopoly in coercive mechanisms for dispute 
resolution to give lawyers a great advantage in performing the role of 
mediator or negotiator. Developments in the nature of these proc­
esses are therefore on a fairly short tether from the system to which 
they are the "alternative." 
The insulation of the system generated and operated by the legal 
profession from serious competition also underpins the strength of the 
market power conferred on individual lawyers by the market imper­
fections I have reviewed in the preceding Sections. Lawyers' monop­
oly over coercive dispute resolution establishes the value of a given 
lawyer's legal services as essentially the entire amount at stake (more 
precisely, the difference between the expected outcome with represen­
tation and without). It is this amount that is then potentially extracted 
by the various imperfections in the market - the deep uncertainty 
about quality, the sunk nature of investments in a choice of lawyer, 
and incremental participation in legal procedures. The keys to the 
courthouse unlock a great bounty. 
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G. Summary: The Sources of Imperfection 
What may be most striking from the preceding catalogue of ways 
in which the market for lawyers departs from the competitive bench­
mark is how this wide gap has gone largely unnoticed in a systematic 
way. Or, more precisely, how the nature of the market has been fi­
nessed into the ethics of professionalism. Attention to the imperfec­
tions in the market for lawyers has been almost exclusively focused on 
artificial barriers such as limited law school seats and restrictions on 
advertising. Yet there is little evidence that increasing law school en­
rollments and the elimination of overt market restrictions has had any 
substantial effect. Indeed the period of increasing growth in the rela­
tive size of the business sector, and the rise of the large firm and the 
escalation in legal fees in this sector, has coincided with increasing 
numbers of lawyers entering the market. 
Closer economic analysis has identified multiple sources of imper­
fection that cause the market for lawyers to deviate, perhaps very sub­
stantially, from the competitive model. Overall there would appear to 
be significant market power wielded by lawyers, despite their increas­
ing numbers. The major concession to competition would appear to 
be the ultimate fall-out of successive winner-take-all tournaments: 
spumed by more lucrative uncompetitive markets, lawyers compete to 
provide basic services for individuals with routine, largely non­
contested legal matters. Outside of this relatively small sector, legal 
fees would appear to be determined by a host of dynamics that are 
related to the wealth of the client and not the opportunity cost of the 
service. 
Looking at the market imperfections as a whole, it is possible to 
identify three fundamental features of the market for lawyers as the 
source of the market power lawyers possess: the complexity of legal 
reasoning and process, the monopoly the profession holds over coer­
cive dispute resolution, and the unified nature of the profession. 
Complexity. The complexity of legal reasoning and process is fun­
damental to the entire market. It is the source of direct cost, as we 
have seen. But more importantly it plays a central role in a host of in­
direct distortions. It is responsible for the credence nature of legal 
services: the complexity of law is so extensive that even the expert 
providing the service has difficulty assessing the quality and necessity 
of services provided. This makes price and quantity in the market 
predominantly the result of beliefs and wealth, rather than of cost. 
Complexity and unpredictability are also responsible for the winner­
take-all dynamics that structure successive tournaments among law­
yers, tournaments in which winning may reflect only negligible quality 
differences in fact. Winning nonetheless establishes a public signal 
that drives clients to bid for the winner's services. Complexity also 
gives rise to the sunk costs associated with establishing a lawyer-client 
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relationship, sunk costs that grant a lawyer power to extract wealth 
with only muted competition. Complexity is responsible for the in­
cremental nature of legal billing, which results in sunk cost auction 
dynamics that leave clients vulnerable to being in a position where 
they face no rational choice but to expend legal fees beyond the value 
of the case and up to the amount of wealth available. And complexity 
places a practical limit on the supply of individuals who have the ca­
pacity to engage in legal reasoning. 
Paradoxically, complexity is also at the root of the historical ab­
sence of regulation to control the dynamics that complexity creates in 
the market for lawyers. Complexity of law, it is argued, makes it im­
possible for nonlawyers to judge the conduct of lawyers or the legal 
needs of clients. This is the purported justification for self-regulation. 
It is also the purported justification for granting lawyers a monopoly 
over the provision of services necessary to access the legal institutions 
of the state and the state's coercive dispute resolution power. 
Monopoly. But rather than controlling the consequences of com­
plexity, monopoly forms the second leg on which the market power of 
the legal profession rests. The monopoly that is essential is not the 
monopoly the profession has over the provision of legal services. This 
monopoly is only of importance because it transfers into the hands of 
lawyers a much more fundamental monopoly: the state's monopoly 
over the democratically legitimate exercise of force. This is most rec­
ognizable when the legal system is seen as a dispute resolution mecha­
nism: it is the only coercive mechanism available. It is without com­
petitors. Whatever coercive power alternative mechanisms possess 
comes only through the invocation of state power, such as in the en­
forcement of arbitration awards. 
The state also has a monopoly over the protection of individual 
rights, social order, management of the economy, and so on. If this 
sounds jarring it is only because it is definitional of the emergence of 
states. On a social contract view, individuals and groups give up the 
right to exercise force, or rather accept the illegitimacy of their exer­
cise of force, in exchange for state protection. The state's legal system 
then regulates the state's exercise of force. It does so, again, without 
competition from alternative sources of protection, order, economic 
regulation, and so on: whatever competitors may present themselves 
is either illegitimate, or else derives its legitimate use of force from the 
state and so is subject to the limitations established by the state.89 
It is important to emphasize this apparently obvious point because 
it is so often missed when we begin to speak of a market for legal 
services. Market language here tends to conjure up the idea of substi-
89. For a careful treatment of the difficulties with this concept, see Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1213, 1213-18 (1994). 
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tution and choice among alternatives. But while there may be a mar­
ket for lawyers, in the domestic setting there is no market for legal sys­
tems or coercive mechanisms.90 
The market power that lawyers ultimately possess, then, is that the 
system to which they hold the keys exercises the only legitimate coer­
cive power in society. The value potential clients derive from access to 
the system, whether as plaintiff or defendant, is then virtually unlim­
ited. At times it is the value of life itself; at others the value of one's 
children, employment, health, dignity, security, privacy, and so on. 
Frequently it is the wealth, or large components of the wealth, of an 
individual or entity. The market power of lawyers is the power to ex­
tract these values, this wealth. The result is that of a classic monopoly: 
price is determined by wealth, not cost. 
The Unified Profession. The driving role that complexity and mo­
nopoly give to wealth takes on special significance in the market for 
lawyers because of the third leg on which the market power of lawyers 
rests: the unified nature of the legal profession. Although there are 
systematic differences among lawyers, and plenty of specialization and 
socioeconomic barriers affecting the distribution of lawyers across the 
corporate and personal spheres,91 we nonetheless have a single "legal 
system." We train all our lawyers in essentially the same way, and 
they receive the same license to practice. In most cases, and in all 
cases at the appellate level, the judge is a generalist who hears and de­
cides on law from across the legal spectrum. Civil procedure is gener­
ally established by a single set of rules that cover all cases; statutory 
and common law exceptions are derived from the same basic princi­
ples and subject to the limitations ultimately found in the Constitution 
and principles of natural justice. The substantive norms - both those 
known and those unacknowledged - are fairly constant throughout 
the entire system. As the functions of law have evolved over time -
from keeping public order and enforcing individual promises to pro­
tecting individual rights, structuring democratic institutions and gov­
ernments, regulating complex economies, resolving disputes in in­
creasingly heterogeneous communities, and so on - "law" has taken 
it all in under one umbrella. 
90. Again, the large corporate client has some scope for choice in the international set­
ting. International transactions can select a jurisdiction and make a choice of law; within a 
federal system such as in the U.S. and Canada, some selection can be made between states 
or provinces. Even then, however, because the systems among which there can be choice are 
the only systems in those jurisdictions, and hence they serve multiple goals, this "market" 
cannot be terribly responsive to "incentives" to innovate or improve procedure. More trou­
bling, however, is the fact that whatever response there can be is responsive to the needs of 
large corporate actors, which will often run counter to the needs of noncommercial or 
smaller actors and individual citizens. 
91. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 27. 
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Seen from a market perspective, this means that all these interests, 
all the individuals and entities who represent and pursue these inter­
ests, are pitted against one another in competition for access to legal 
resources. If we divide the world into personal and business clients, 
personal and business legal matters (as empirical research confirms we 
confidently can), it is immediately evident that these client groups 
fundamentally differ in terms of their command of wealth. It is the 
wealth of the business client group that ultimately determines pricing 
in the market(s) for lawyers. Driven by corporate demand, backed by 
corporate wealth, the legal system prices itself out of the reach of all 
individuals except those with a claim on corporate wealth. 
This is not a point about income distribution. The wealth of cor­
porations is structurally different from the wealth of individuals. Cor­
porations are aggregations of individual valuations. Their total com­
mand of wealth is a function of the number of consumers on whose 
individual wealth their products lay a claim: a consumer products 
company, for example, is valued in the multi-millions, if not billions, of 
dollars if it commands even just a few dollars of the wealth of a huge 
number of consumers. Their ability to capture consumer wealth is 
generated often by the further aggregation of individual shareholder 
wealth. 
Corporate wealth is consequently of a different order of magnitude 
than the wealth of individuals, even wealthy individuals. The wealthy 
individuals for whom this is least true generally derive their wealth 
from their ownership of corporations. But even these individuals face 
a competitive disadvantage in the competition for legal services. Cor­
porate legal fees are tax-deductible, not so the fees paid by an individ­
ual. And while there may be defensible justifications for this tax pol­
icy, it remains true that the differences in tax treatment imply that 
corporations ultimately pay a lower price for lawyers than do indi­
viduals. Depending on corporate tax rates, an individual may end up 
paying as much as twice the fee paid by a corporation and hence is 
even more vulnerable to being outbid by the corporation. 
A market that puts individual clients in a bidding competition with 
corporate clients therefore necessarily ends up serving predominantly 
corporate clients at a price determined by corporate pre-tax wealth. 
This is a price that is systematically out of the reach of individuals. 
The only exceptions are individuals who have claims on aggregated 
wealth which can be accessed to pay lawyers, such as the victims of 
torts committed by corporate or insured tortfeasors, or shareholders 
with the right to maintain a derivative action against corporate man­
agers. These exceptions are the rule: the market for lawyers - law­
yers who can provide services to individuals and corporations alike -
overwhelmingly allocates legal resources to clients with interests 
backed by corporate aggregations of wealth. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM 
The market for lawyers is fundamentally noncompetitive. As a 
consequence of the complexity of legal reasoning and procedure, the 
profession's derived monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion, and 
the unification of the profession to serve the diverse needs for access 
to law, the price of law that emerges from the free market for lawyers 
is too high. This has fundamental implications for the (mis)allocation 
of legal resources among the diverse goals of a legal system and for the 
achievement, in fact, of justice in society. 
The economic analysis of the imperfections in the market for law­
yers and their roots in complexity, monopoly, and the unification of 
the profession, gives rise to two very important questions. The first is, 
to what extent, if any, does the market allocation of lawyers meet the 
normative goals of a justice system in a democratic society? The sec­
ond is, if the allocation of legal resources stemming from the market 
for lawyers is inconsistent with our normative precepts, what might be 
done to reform the system? Each of these questions demands careful 
treatment on its own. What follows are brief introductory remarks on 
the normative implications and possibilities for reform of the legal sys­
tem. 
A. Normative Implications: Judging the Justice System 
The allocation of resources according to wealth is hardly news in a 
market economy. Every student of basic economics realizes that the 
demand curve reflects not only willingness but also ability to pay. The 
great normative challenge is the assessment of need, want, and enti­
tlement across individuals, and the reconciliation of imperfections in 
allocation with the efficiency benefits of market systems. Theories of 
distributive justice, such as that of John Rawls, work to develop prin­
cipled means of establishing when individuals are entitled to equality 
with others and when allocative differences among individuals are jus­
tified. 
The wealth-based allocation of lawyers, and hence of access to the 
legal system, is of categorically different normative significance from 
the wealth-based allocation of ordinary goods and services across indi­
viduals. The market for lawyers allocates access to law not merely 
among individuals but, more importantly, between individuals as a 
group and corporations as a group. Any conception of social justice, 
however, is about the rights and well-being of individuals qua indi­
viduals. The public interest in the legal claims of corporations is de­
rivative of the fundamental interests of individuals. Law governing 
corporate relationships and conduct is primarily of interest because of 
its impact on the functioning of the economy, the source of wealth for 
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the members of the society. The corporation is not a member of civil 
society; it is an object and instrument of civil society.92 
The allocation of lawyers and access between individuals and cor­
porations is not, in the main, a matter of choosing amongst the claims 
of the members of society. It is a matter of choosing amongst the vari­
ety of goals on which the aspirations of a just society depend. The 
separate client groups that emerge in the market for lawyers represent 
fundamentally different goals for the legal system. Individuals invoke 
those parts of the legal system concerned with individual rights, per­
sonal dispute resolution, democratic governance, and social control. 
Business clients invoke those parts of the legal system concerned with 
management of the economy and corporate relationships - policing 
market conduct, regulating the production and distribution of goods 
and services by businesses, and resolving disputes between market 
competitors and contracting partners. Even in a case between an indi­
vidual and a corporate entity, the individual interests at stake invoke 
considerations that are fundamentally different from those invoked by 
the corporate entity. To put the point in its starkest form, individual 
clients invoke the justice concerns of the legal system, and business 
clients invoke the economic concerns. 
A more nuanced treatment of the normative implications of the 
primacy that the market for lawyers accords to the legal claims of cor­
porations will have to take into account the fact that corporations are 
composed of individuals: they act through the actions of individuals, 
and they are funded by the individual wealth of shareholders. It will 
also have to take into account the access that is available to the indi­
vidual who has a claim on the resources of the corporation. The ac­
cess to legal protection that a corporate connection affords these indi­
viduals is a more familiar matter of distributive justice: between the 
rich and the poor in a society, between individuals who own capital 
and those who rely on labour income, between (surprisingly) those 
who are injured by corporations and those who are injured by fellow 
citizens. Recognizing these more conventional normative conse­
quences of the market allocation of lawyers does not, however, take 
away from the fundamental point that has gone largely unnoticed: 
when our legal system relies on the market allocation of lawyers under 
conditions of complexity, monopoly, and unification, it chooses the 
management of the economy over the justice of social and political 
relationships as its central preoccupation. It establishes the govern­
ance of the economy as the principal role of the justice system. 
92. For an analysis of a corporate "right" to freedom of speech from this perspective, 
see Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communica­
tions by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 19 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1244-48 (1991). 
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B. Reforming the Justice System(s) 
Although a thoughtful approach to reforming the justice system 
must await the more careful normative work to which I have alluded, a 
few points clearly follow from what we have learned thus far. 
First, it is important to emphasize that governance of the economy 
is a legitimate and necessary role for a legal system. There is no jus­
tice in the freedom to starve. The problem with the market for law­
yers, however, is that this role squeezes out the other legitimate, and 
arguably primary, roles for law. It does so not on the basis of a princi­
pled determination of the balance between efficiency and the distribu­
tion of goods, including Rawls's primary goods,93 but rather on the ba­
sis of the structural differences in the nature of individual and 
corporate wealth. It is hard to imagine any normative theory that 
would justify this distribution, particularly given the derivative nature 
of corporate claims and entitlements on resources, autonomy, and so 
on. The question for reform, then, is likely to be how the legal system 
might be restructured so as to reconcile the achievement of economic 
goals with more fundamental justice goals. 
Although a careful treatment of prescriptions for what ails the jus­
tice system requires further work, the economic analysis of the market 
for lawyers provides a starting point for thinking about reform. 
Above all, the economic analysis tells us that the problem of access to 
the legal system as between corporate and individual clients is not 
simply a matter of legal ethics. This is not to say that there are no 
ethical issues that lawyers must face in terms of if and how they charge 
for their services. It is to say that exhortations to the bar to increase 
their pro bono efforts or to law students to choose low paying public 
interest work over corporate careers are incapable of making signifi­
cant inroads on the fundamental incentives and outcomes of the mar­
ket for lawyers. It is to say that the causes of the problems of access 
and (mis)allocation in the system have deep, structural roots that only 
deep, structural change can reach. What follows are some preliminary 
conjectures that flow from the identification of the three legs which 
support the market power of lawyers and give wealth the defining role 
in the allocation of resources across the diverse goals of the legal sys­
tem. 
Complexity. As we have seen, complexity is at the root of numer­
ous distortions in the market for lawyers. These are not limited to the 
well-recognized direct effects arising from the cost of learning, inter-
93. Rawls uses the term "primary goods" to refer to liberty, dignity, and so on. See 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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preting, applying, and litigating complex rules and procedures.94 The 
effect of complexity runs deep, disabling competitive mechanisms and 
limiting the supply of potential providers, setting up tournament and 
auction dynamics that extract wealth. It is natural, therefore, to look 
to the possibility of reduced complexity as a way of reducing the dis­
tortions in the justice system. 
Reducing complexity, however, raises deep philosophical and prac­
tical questions which all come down to this: is legal reasoning, as we 
know it,95 what law and justice is? Our law is complex as a result of a 
natural entropy arising from the reasoning that leads lawyers, most 
importantly judges, to see distinctions or parallels that were previously 
hidden or unappreciated. The redrawing of the lines in the law that 
results from recognition of new distinctions and parallels is not, how­
ever, seen as a matter of election or caprice. It is seen as a matter of 
justice: justice requires, compels even, that the lines be redrawn. Our 
legal reasoning is our way of reasoning about justice. Should we rea­
son otherwise? What would that mean? Would it be possible? 
Would it be stable? 
These are enormously difficult questions about human thought and 
justice, well beyond the ken of an exclusively economic analysis. What 
the economic analysis does illuminate, however, is what it is that legal 
theorists need to think hard about. Because law is not delivered in the 
abstract but is delivered through a market mechanism, justice in the­
ory not only departs from justice in fact, but it is the cause of the de­
parture. When justice in our case-by-case system compels an incre­
ment in the complexity of our understanding of the just treatment of a 
dispute between litigants, it does so, incrementally, at the expense of 
reducing access to justice more generally. Exquisite justice for some 
systematically results in rough justice for others. Where is the justice 
in that? The question is not rhetorical. 
Monopoly. Given the mind-boggling jurisprudential questions im­
plicated in any effort to reduce legal complexity, monopoly problems 
seem straightforward in comparison. Monopoly is at least a well­
rehearsed market imperfection. In the legal market, however, mo­
nopoly is a tough nut to crack. 
The first problem is that the standard responses to monopoly are 
either largely inapplicable or ineffective in the market for lawyers. 
While reductions in artificial barriers to entry are possible, and neces­
sary, we have seen both from the theory and the empirical evidence 
94. Richard Epstein has examined some of the implications of complex rules in his 
writings. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD {1995). 
95. My own familiarity with common law systems, and the interpretation of statutes in a 
common law system, leads me to restrict this observation to those systems. Whether the le­
gal reasoning in civil or other legal systems shows the same natural entropy as common law 
systems is a matter for further research. 
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that artificial barriers play a relatively small role in the restriction on 
the supply of potential lawyers. Despite significant reductions in arti­
ficial barriers over the past several decades, the cost of lawyers in the 
dominant sector of the market has increased substantially. Together 
with the theory, this suggests that the more important entry barriers 
are ones that are much more difficult to address: the "natural" limita­
tions on supply arising from the level of cognitive ability required to 
effectively participate in our complex legal system and the fundamen­
tal monopoly held by the state over the use of coercion in the resolu­
tion of disputes and the protection of rights and social order. Reduc­
ing the barriers raised by complexity puts us back to enormously 
difficult jurisprudential questions. Eliminating the state's monopoly 
over force is equivalent to undoing the social contract. 
The relevant monopolies in law are akin to natural monopolies 
such as public utilities. The complexity barrier to becoming a lawyer is 
also akin to the barrier that makes physicians a limited and hence ex­
pensive resource. The price regulation that is conventionally used to 
control monopoly power in these more familiar monopolies is, how­
ever, at risk of being counterproductive in law. Pure price regulation, 
given the other features of the market for lawyers, is likely only to ex­
acerbate the distorting role that wealth plays. Capped prices make 
volume of work even more important; a corporate client becomes 
even more attractive than an individual client because the corporate 
client is likely to generate, and have the wealth to pay for, more hours 
of work. It is not even clear, given the distortions of complexity, and 
particularly the dynamics of the sunk cost auction and the credence 
nature of legal services, that total fees for a given legal matter will be 
reduced if prices are regulated: the power to extract wealth under 
cover of complexity can be exercised through hours and procedures as 
well as rates. Even regulation of total fees for legal services is likely to 
leave the preference for corporate clients untouched: corporate cli­
ents are likely to be repeat customers, whereas individuals are not. 
All of this is not to say that price regulation is impossible, but rather 
that it is clearly a challenge to conventional regulatory theory. 
There may be more promise in what is becoming a conventional 
piece of modem public utility regulation: unbundling. The state has, 
practically by definition, a monopoly on the use of coercion in dispute 
resolution and social control. This does not imply, however, that the 
state must exercise a monopoly on the procedures or the venues 
regulating coercion, or a monopoly on the substantive determination 
of the merits of a dispute. It is conceivable, for example, that the state 
would blindly enforce the dispute resolution orders of a purely private 
arbitration mechanism, without avenue for review of the merits or 
procedures. This would minimize the contact with the state monopoly 
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element and present the possibility of competition among arbitration 
mechanisms and, indeed, private legal systems.96 The question would 
then be a normative one: to what extent should the state be involved 
in the development and implementation of substantive and procedural 
law? Does the rationale for the state's role in law vary across the dif­
ferent goals of a legal and democratic order? What the economics of 
the market for lawyers tell us is that any answers to this question must 
take into account that the state's monopolistic exercise of an expan­
sive role has important effects in practice on the achievement of the 
diverse goals of a just society. 
The Unified Profession. Both the empirical evidence regarding the 
dominance of commercial clients in the system and the economic 
analysis of the market for lawyers indicate that there is some urgency 
in coming to grips with the apparently widening gulf between the ide­
als of justice and the reality of how those ideals are achieved in prac­
tice. The necessity of complex legal reasoning and the state's role in 
developing and implementing law are, however, monumental ques­
tions and truly daunting for the project of legal reform. Fortunately 
these questions also bring into sharper focus the importance of the 
third leg on which the distortions in the market for lawyers rest, be­
cause it is this third leg that is the most amenable to social change. 
Moreover, it turns out that the questions of complexity and monopoly 
are more easily approached when we pay attention to the unified na­
ture of the legal profession. 
As we have seen, by keeping under one roof the multiple roles for 
a modem legal system - management of the economy, individual jus­
tice, social control, and so on - the role that complexity and monop­
oly accord to wealth, rather than cost, in the market allocation of law­
yers perpetuates a system that is heavily, and it seems increasingly, 
skewed towards managing the economy rather than safeguarding just 
relationships and democratic institutions. The boundaries of the pro­
fession, of "the" legal system are, however, a matter of institutional 
and deliberate choice, established by licensing and educational re­
quirements. While there are very important practical questions to be 
answered, in theory at least it is quite possible to conceive of a differ­
ent set of boundaries and indeed of a separation between the justice 
system and the legal governance of the economy. Abandoning the 
concept of the unified profession here would mean, over time, the de­
velopment of professional identities, degrees, training, and practices 
that could become as distinct from each other as, for example, those of 
the M.B.A. and the M.S.W. 
96. See LISA BERNSTEIN, THE NEW LAW MERCHANT: PR!V ATE COMMERCIAL LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1995) (discussing private legal systems and merchant law history). 
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To some extent, this market "fix" would endeavour to segregate 
corporate clients from individual clients and reduce or eliminate the 
movement of "lawyers" between these groups in response to market 
incentives. It is an interesting question as to whether, if forced to 
choose between a degree in preparation to work in corporate law and 
one in preparation to work in the justice system, students would flock 
to the corporate world in the same numbers as lawyers do now. Part 
of the attraction of law to many law students seems indeed to be that 
the degree allows them to maintain some contradictions in their career 
and life goals: law students are (usually) ones who did not sign up for 
the M.B.A., but nor did they sign up for the M.S.W. Most law stu­
dents come into law school with some motivation to do work related 
to social justice; as the data indicate, most come out and eventually do 
work related to the management of commerce and the economy. 
The importance of exploring the potential for disaggregating the 
profession, however, extends beyond putting in place a barrier to the 
mobility of "lawyers" between social justice work and economic man­
agement work. The legal profession does more than just deliver legal 
services; it constitutes the legal system. It is the group in society that 
develops and implements the structures, the reasons, the norms, and 
the processes of legal order. As an organic institution, what emerges 
in the different spheres of the legal system grows out of common soil. 
Indeed, one of the justifications for a unified profession has come to 
be precisely the idea that the principles governing the relationships in 
all these spheres - contract, property, tort, due process, and so on -
are universal. But are they? And even if they are, should they be, if 
the price is, in practice, a skewed emphasis on economic relationships 
rather than on the other relationships of a civil society? 
The questions raised about complexity and the state's role in coer­
cive dispute resolution suggest not. Indeed they suggest that part of 
the unified appearance of the legal system across these different 
spheres comes from a failure to attend closely enough to the misappli­
cation to economic entities of ideas rooted in conceptions of justice for 
the members of a democracy. The mind-boggling quality of the ques­
tion - is the complexity of legal reasoning necessary to the very idea 
of justice - stems from the intricacies of the justice of human social, 
familial, and political relations. Respect for the individual establishes 
an enormous barrier to any sort of instrumental approach to dishing 
out justice case-by-case; the equality of persons and the incomparabil­
ity of the moral worth of individuals is what makes tradeoffs in justice 
for him against justice for her so difficult. It may be technically chal­
lenging, but it does not appear philosophically challenging, however, 
to take an instrumental approach to trading off the predominantly 
economic values at stake in the structuring and regulation of economic 
relationships. It just is categorically different to say to a corporate liti­
gant, "although we can see the merits in this case of an expansive 
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reading of the contract or the statute, we will not do so because of the 
consequences for the cost of system as a whole," than it is to say this 
same thing to someone accused of a crime or at risk of losing contact 
with his or her children or seeking enforcement of a democratic right. 
The justice system does have to attend to the costs of administration, 
but the tenor of the inquiry is fundamentally different in these spheres 
because the values at stake are fundamentally different. 
Similarly, the question of the appropriate role of the state in the 
development and implementation of the legal rules recognizes a sharp 
distinction between management of the economy and management of 
individual, social, and political relations. There is something quite ap­
pealing about relegating commercial disputes to a market for private 
dispute resolution mechanisms with blind state enforcement: failures 
in individual cases would be left to market correction, not judicial cor­
rection. But there is something quite appalling about suggesting the 
same in the protection of individual rights or the resolution of individ­
ual disputes. Justice may well demand public care in the latter, and 
allow private determination in the former. 
What began as a simple question, then, about the price of lawyers 
has transformed into a series of fundamentally important questions 
about how the legal system and the legal profession have evolved and 
how they should meet the future. The economic answers that the 
analysis has uncovered in the role of complexity, monopoly, and the 
unified profession in deforming the market for lawyers and hence the 
allocation of legal effort have left us with fundamental jurisprudential 
questions that demand careful attention from the legal profession. 
Unless we take this work seriously, the price of law will be justice. 
